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A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen andphilosophersand divines. With consistency a greatsoul has simply
nothing to do. He may as well concern himselfwith his shadow on the wall. Speak
what you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks
in hardwords again, though it contradicteverythingyou saidto-day.
-Ralph Waldo Emerson
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issues a Priority Guidance
Plan-a list of regulatory projects that will receive priority attention over the
coming fiscal year.' Many of the items on the Priority Guidance Plan are carryover projects-guidance that the IRS intended to issue in the prior fiscal year, but
did not finish (or sometimes, even start). Some of the projects on the Plan,
however, are completely new. A review of these new projects often provides
insight into what the IRS is seeing on a regular basis, and the IRS' regulatory
direction. 2
In the Exempt Organization section of the 2013-2014 Priority Guidance
Plan, the following project appeared for the first time': "Guidance under § 4941
regarding a private foundation's investment in a partnership in which disqualified
persons are also partners." The project reappeared in the 2014-2015 Priority
Guidance Plan4 and again in the 2015-2016 Priority Guidance Plan.5 The 20162017 Priority Guidance Plan, released on August 15, 2016, continues to list this
6
project.
The appearance of a regulatory project regarding partnership investments
under the private foundation self-dealing rules of Code7 Section 4941 came as an
unwelcome surprise to many practitioners. The IRS issued a series of private letter

' I.R.S., Priority Guidance Plan, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Priority-Guidance-Plan (last updated July

18, 2016) [hereinafter the 2016-2017 Plan or 2016-2017 Priority Guidance Plan].
see, e.g, Dominick Schirripa, IRS's 2015-16 Priority Guidance Plan Is a Mix of the Old and
the New on EGT Topics, EST. TAx BLOG (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.bna.com/irss-201516-priorityb17179935562/; Treasury DepartmentandIRS Issue PriorityGuidance Plan, MORGAN LEWIS (Aug.
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/tax-exempt If 201326,
2013),
2014priorityguidanceplanissued_26augl3.
2 Id.;

Compare DEP'T

OF

THE

TREASURY,

2013-2014

PRIORITY

GUIDANCE

PLAN

(2013),

https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2013-2014_pgp.pdf with DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2012-2013
PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN (2012), https://www.irs.gov/PUP/pub/irs-utl/2012-2013_pgp.pdf (no
reference to Code Section 4941).
4

DEP'T
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THE

TREASURY,

2014-2015

PRIORITY

GUIDANCE

PLAN

10

(2014),

https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2014-2015_pgp initial.pdf (Exempt Organizations, Item 10).
5

DEP'T

OF

THE

TREASURY,

2015-2016

PRIORITY

GUIDANCE

PLAN

9

(2015),

https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2015-2016_pgp initial.pdf (Exempt Organizations, Item 7).
6 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2016-2017 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN (2016) (Exempt Organizations, item
10).
Unless otherwise indicated, references to the "Code" mean the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
from time to time amended.
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rulings (PLRs) addressing this issue in the early 2000s, which seemed to bless such
partnership arrangements, at least under some circumstances.' After the last PLR
in the series was released, the IRS made little further noise regarding this issue.
Private foundations and their advisors quietly relied on the PLRs and set up their
investment structures accordingly.9 Investing happened.
When the Code Section 4941 regulatory project first appeared on the 20132014 Priority Guidance Plan a decade (or more) after the PLRs, private foundations
now had to review their existing investment structures with a troubled eye."o Were
the structures that were set up in reliance on the PLRs still valid, assuming they
ever were? What exactly was the IRS targeting? Would it be necessary to unwind
such arrangements? Would they be grandfathered? Should a private foundation be
proactive in advance of the guidance from the IRS? Such a brief statement of a
potential future project has caused great consternation among many private
foundations (and their advisors).
So what was the investment structure that caught the eye of the IRS and
which now causes such unease? A private foundation is a subset of charitable
organizations exempt from income tax under Code Section 501 (c)(3). " Because a
private foundation is usually funded and controlled by a single donor or family, it
is subject to a series of excise taxes designed to regulate its behavior, found in
Chapter 42 of the Code. These excise taxes, passed in 1969, include a number of
prohibitions and limitations on the investment activities of private foundations.
This specifically includes a strict prohibition on transactions with parties related to
the private foundation, known as disqualified persons. This prohibition, found in
Code Section 4941, applies to all transactions with disqualified persons, 12 even if
the transactions are at or below fair market value or otherwise in the foundation's
best interest.13
The question then becomes whether investment structures designed
primarily to allow private foundations and their disqualified persons to invest
jointly in certain alternative investments violate the self-dealing prohibition of
Code Section 4941. In its most basic form, a private foundation becomes a partner

8 See discussion infra Section III.D (discussing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200148069 (July 17, 2001);

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200318069 (Feb. 3, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200420029 (Feb. 19, 2004);
and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200551025 (Sept. 28, 2005).
9 I.R.C. § 61 10(k)(3) (West 2015); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71
U. CHI. L. REv. 1383, 1391-92 (2004) (while private letter rulings may not be relied upon as authority
in court, they are commonly used to provide guidance to practitioners in creating legal structures).
10 Grace Allison, 2013-14 Priority Guidance Plan Has a Surprise for Private Foundations,
AMERICANBAR.ORG

(Oct.

5,

2013),

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/rpte ereport/2013/5_october/teallison.au
thcheckdam.pdf; see also Dominick Schirripa, For Exempt Organizations, IRS PriorityGuidance
Plan Feels a Lot Like GroundhogDay, EST. TAX BLOG (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.bna.com/exempt-

organizations-irs-b 17179895389/.
1 See the definition of a private foundation infra Part III.A.
12 For the definition of a disqualified person, see infra Part III.C.
13 See generally I.R.C. § 4941(d) (West 2015); see also the discussion ofthe private foundation excise

taxes and specifically the self-dealing excise tax of Code Section 4941 infra Part III.C.
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in a partnership in which one of the private foundation's disqualified persons is
also a partner. In many cases, the partnership itself is a disqualified person as a
result of the ownership of the partnership by disqualified persons. 14 By way of
example, a private foundation and two of its trustees might wish to enter into a
private equity fund, but none of the three of them have sufficient liquid assets to
meet the fund's minimum contribution requirement. They might, however,
aggregate their funds in a partnership in order to meet minimum investment
requirement, with the partnership making the investment in the fund." This
arrangement raises the question of whether the private foundation is engaged in an
act of self-dealing prohibited by Code Section 4941 because it involves the sale or
exchange of property between a private foundation and a disqualified person or a
use of the private foundation's assets by a disqualified person.16
The PLRs allow such an arrangement, on the notion that when a private
foundation invests in a partnership, it is not entering into a transaction of any kind
with either the partnership itself or the other partners.17 Rather, the IRS treats the
partners as if they are merely investing side-by-side, or, in the language of PLR
200318069, they were merely in a "co-investment arrangement." Under this
analysis, the IRS treats the partners as if they own a proportionate share of the
underlying partnership assets directly.' 8 As a result, there is no transaction between
the private foundation and either the other partners or the partnership itself, and
therefore, there can be no act of self-dealing.
Some have questioned whether it is wise to rely on these PLRs.' 9 The
notion that there is no transaction between the private foundation and the other
4
1

See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200318069 (Feb. 3, 2003) (private foundation to invest in the general
partner of a hedge fund along with its primary funder/foundation manager, and an entity owned by
the primary funder, his wife and their children; because the owners of the general partner were all
disqualified persons, the general partner itself was a disqualified person).
15 Such a structure might separate securities law issues, as discussed infra Part II.D.
16 I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1)(A), (E) (West 2015).
17
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200318069 (Feb. 3, 2003).
11 Both I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200318069 (Feb. 3, 2003) and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200420029 (Feb.
19, 2004) cite to the legislative history of the private foundation excise taxes (namely, the Senate
Finance Committee report accompanying the 1969 legislation (citing S. REP. No. 91-522, at 41
(1969)), stating that in the case of the stock of a passive holding company (which is not treated as a
business enterprise for purposes of I.R.C. § 4943), "the foundation is treated as owning its
proportionate share of the underlying assets of the holding company." H.R. 13270, S. 42, 91st Cong.
(1969). The flaw in this argument is that the legislative history quoted is for Code Section 4943 and
not Code Section 4941. Compare I.R.C. § 4943 (West 2015) with 1.R.C. § 4941 (West 2015). Code
Section 4943's look through rule is necessary to prevent a private foundation from placing excess
business holdings in a corporate holding company and using that as a blocker to circumvent the
limitations in the statute. While I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200551025 (Sept. 28, 2005) does not cite to this
same language, it does discuss the partnership at issue as "joint or co-investments." I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 200551025 (Dec. 23, 2005).
'1 Matthew J. Gries, Independent Foundations Legal Update, Southeastern Council of Foundations
2013
Annual
Meeting
(Nov.
14,
2013),
http://www.secf.orglassets/site/AnnualMeeting/2013/Presentations/14.20.pdf ("Relying on these
PLRs is not without risk because (i) PLRs are not precedential and (ii) these PLRs present very little
analysis (and rely on substance over form principles).").
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partners or the partnership when the foundation contributes capital to the
partnership seems directly to contradict the common understanding of partnership
property interests for both state law and federal tax law purposes.20 Is the inherent
dissonance between this series of PLRs and fundamental notions of partnership
interests under state law and Subchapter K part of the reason why the IRS is
revisiting the issue of private foundation co-investments? Assuming for the
moment that such theoretical dissonance exists, should the IRS care? Is
consistency the hobgoblin of little minds, or does it actually add to our
understanding of the tax code?
At first glance, this question may appear to be a technical question that
affects only a handful of large family foundations. It implicates, however, a
number of significant legal issues, ranging from state partnership law to the
securities laws to the income tax laws. Additionally, this technical question raises
the issue of the role of the legislators and regulators in considering consistency
within the codes that they write and interpret, and the expectation of consistency
that may be held by the judicial branch. Finally, it implicates current trends in
philanthropy, such as the increased investment by endowments in private equity
and the move to for-profit philanthropy vehicles, as evidenced by the Chan
Zuckerberg Initiative.
This Article begins with an introduction to private foundation investing,
including investments in alternative assets, the use of family offices in investing,
the increased incidence of investment with affiliated parties, and basic securities
law issues. With this background, Part III of the Article describes the private
foundation excise taxes, generally, and specifically Code Section 4941's excise tax
on acts of self-dealing. Part III also analyzes the Internal Revenue Service's current
treatment of investment structures that allow private foundations to invest- in
alternative investments along with its affiliated parties as co-investments so as to
avoid violating the Code Section 4941 self-dealing prohibition. The IRS' current
treatment of co-investment partnerships is then compared to how other parts of the
Code (namely, Subchapter K) and state partnership law approach issues of coinvestment in Part IV. As Part IV will demonstrate, there appears to be an
inconsistency between the PLRs on the one hand and the Subehapter K and state
law approaches to partnership co-investment on the other; in response, Part V will

In this presentation, Ruth Madrigal, Attorney-Advisor, Office of Tax Policy of the Department of the
Treasury (Sept. 20, 2013) is quoted as saying: "Many of you are aware that there have been PLRs
over the years in this area, and sometimes this is referred to as 'co-investing.' And TE/GE has
received PLR requests in this area more recently, and we think this is an area that would benefit from
some additional guidance and guidance of general applicability, things that folks could all rely on.
So we are looking into this area, and we intend to do some work on it," citing ABA Transcript:
Transcriptofthe September 20, 2013, ABA Tax Section's Exempt OrganizationsCommittee Meeting,
72 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 567, 569 (Dec. 2013).
20 Douglas M. Mancino and Ofer Lion, Co-Investing by Private Foundations and Disqualified
Persons, 23 TAX'N OF EXEMPTS, Nov.-Dec. 2011, at 3 (recognizing that the investment in a

partnership involves a sale or exchange, but otherwise supporting the IRS' line of reasoning in the
PLRs on substance over form principles).
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discuss whether consistency is necessary or if it can be sacrificed to achieve other
goals. The Article concludes with a suggestion for the outlines of a regulatory safe
harbor that could harmonize the IRS' treatment of partnership co-investment with
state law and Subchapter K--or at least, maybe, the dissonance can be minimized
to acceptable levels.
H. THE SELF-DEALING RULES AND PRIVATE FOUNDATION COINVESTING
A. The Reality of Foundation Investing
The self-dealing rules of Code Section 4941 can create significant
landmines for private foundation investing.2 1 The manner in which a private
foundation manages its investment activities varies by the size of the foundation. 2 2
For large independent foundations, the foundation's investments may be handled
by an inside Chief Investment Officer, 23 supported by an outside firm that may be
affiliated with or recommended by one or more foundation managers. 24 For smaller
foundations, investments are typically handled by the foundation managers
directly or by hiring an outside investment advisor. 25 For larger family foundations,
investing is significantly more complicated: often the investments for the entire
family and all affiliated entities are run centrally, which may include the
involvement of a family office.26 Whether by coordination or happenstance,

21

James L. Kronenberg, Investing Private FoundationAssets: It's Not Your Father'sPortfolio...or

Your

Sister's ... or

Yours,

BESSEMER

TRUST,

(Feb.

21,

2016),

https://www.bessemertrust.com/porta/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentD
eliveryServlet/Public/Published/Ou/o20Approach/Pdfs/1 2_28_07_InvestPrivFound.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 21, 2016) ("Some assume that investing for a private foundation is just like investing for
individuals, only it's easier because a private foundation is tax-exempt. Actually, there are many
legal constraints, both fiduciary and tax, that are unique to private foundation investing.").
22
1d; FOUND. SOURCE, ANNUAL REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS (2015) [hereinafter 2015 FOUND.
SOURCE]. According to Foundation Source, of the 91,000 private foundations in existence, 66% have
assets below $1.0 million. Id.
23 By way of example, the Foundation Financial Officers Group is an industry group that typically
consists of financial and investment professional employees of private foundations with assets in
excess of $200.0 million in assets in a diversified investment programs that engage outside
investment managers to manage assets. FFOG Membership Application, FOUND. FIN. OFFICERS
GROUP,
FFOG
Membership
Application,
https://ffog.siteym.com/general/register member type.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). A family office or
management company that provides financial or investment services to anyone other than the donor
and the donor's family and private foundation is not eligible for membership. Membership Eligibility,
FOUND.

FIN.

OFFICERS

GROUP,

Membership

Eligibility,

http://www.ffog.org/?page-MembershipEligibilit (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
24

See COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS-COMMONFUND,

PRIVATE AND COMMUNITY

STUDY OF INVESTMENT OF ENDOWMENTS FOR

FOUNDATIONS, COUNCIL ON FOUND-COMMONFUND,

Aug. 48 (2014)

[hereinafter COMMONFUND STUDY].
25 See generally id. at 50.
26 Private foundations use direct alternative managers at a higher rate than community foundations,
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foundation investments often end up in the same place as the individual
investments of affiliated individuals, businesses, or family trusts.27
The private foundation excise taxes significantly complicate the process
of investing private foundation assets through investment entities that involve
related parties. Clearly, a private foundation must analyze each investment
opportunity for compliance the self-dealing rules of Code Section 4941. In
addition, the excess business holdings rules of Code Section 494328 and the Code
Section 4944 tax on jeopardizing investmentS 29 significantly limit the ability of
private foundations to invest in alternative asset classes. Taken together, the
private foundation excise taxes place a heavy compliance burden on any
foundation that wishes to engage in any type of sophisticated investment strategy.
As a result of the compliance burdens and prohibitions imposed by these
excise taxes on private foundation, some donors have moved away from the
traditional private foundation format as a vehicle to centralize management of
charitable giving.30 This movement resulted in the rise of both the supporting

reflecting a 44% portfolio allocation versus 25% for community foundations in the study group.
Private Foundations with assets over $500 million used three times as many direct alterative
investment managers as community foundations of the same size. Id at 52.
27
1Id. at 34-36. The Commonfund Council on Foundations 2014 study found that private foundations
tend to have small investment committees than community foundations, noting that "in particular,
for family foundations as a subset of private foundations, these committees typically comprise the
founder, family members, close advisers and selected associates from philanthropic or business
organizations." Id at 35. The fund also found that "while private foundations tend to have more
diversified portfolios with significantly larger allocations to alternative investment strategies [than
community foundations]-suggesting that they would likely have proportionately more investment
professionals on their investment committees than do community foundations-the opposite is in
fact true." Id. at 36.
28 Code Section 4943 prohibits the private foundation from owning significant equity interests in
operating businesses in which disqualified persons are also invested. See generally I.R.C. § 4943.
29 Code Section 4944 limits the ability of the private foundation to invest in certain assets that might
endanger the private foundation's charitable purpose. See generally I.R.C. § 4944.
30 For the typical comparison of private foundations to public charities and donor advised funds prior
to 2006, see Craig Wruck & Helen Monroe, Family Foundations: Donor Advised Funds and
Supporting Organizationsas Alternatives to Private Foundations, PLANNED GIVING DESIGN CTR.
14,
1999),
http://www.pgdc.com/pgdc/family-foundations-donor-advised-funds-and(July
supporting-organizations-alternatives-private-foundations, and Victoria B. Bjorklund, Charitable
Giving to a Private Foundationand the Alternatives, the Supporting Organization and the Donor
(1999),
&
L.
ON
PHILANTHROPY
CTR.
NAT'L
Fund,
Advised
http://wwwl.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/pdfs/1999/Confl999_BjorklundFinal.pdf.

400

UMKC LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 85:2

organization 3 1 and the donor advised fund (or DAF). 32 Prior to 2006, supporting
organizations and DAFs were generally governed by the same administrative and
investment rules applicable to all public charities (not the more stringent rules
applicable to private foundations.). When Congress saw the increased use of
supporting organizations and DAFs as ways to have a charitable entity that looked
like a private foundation while avoiding the imposition of the Chapter 42 excise
taxes, it passed significant reforms as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006.33

A supporting organization is a specific type of public charity, described in Code Section 509(a)(3).
See generally 1.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (West 2015); Mark Rambler, Best Supporting Actor: Refining The
509(a)(3) Type 3 Charitable Organization, 51 DuKE L.J. 1367, 1368 (2002). Generally, public
charities are not subject to the oversight of the Chapter 42 excise taxes on the presumption that the
general public and a broad spectrum of donors are overseeing the charity in a manner that is not
present with a private foundation. See id. at 1367-68. A supporting organization is granted public
charity status not because it has a broad range of donors, but because it has a governance relationship
with another public charity, and that public charity has an interest in providing the oversight that
would otherwise be provided by the general public. Thus, a supporting organization can be funded
by a single individual, family, or company, and still obtain public charity status. See generallyJeffrey
D. Davine, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Type 3 SupportingOrganizations,PLANNED
31

GIVING DESIGN CTR. (June 26, 2000), http://www.pgdc.com/pgdc/everything-you-ever-wanted-

&

know-about-type-3-supporting-organizations. A supporting organization is prohibited from
providing support to organizations other than the public charity with whom it is affiliated; however,
selecting a supported organization with a broad charitable mission (such as a community foundation)
allowed a supporting organization to function as if were a private foundation. The supporting
organization came under fire as circumventing Chapter 42, and as a result, supporting organizations
came under scrutiny as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006. See generally Rambler, at 1383.
32 For the current definition of a DAF, see I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2) (West 2015); note, however, that
Congress enacted Code Section 4966 in 2006. Prior to 2006, there was no statutory or regulatory
definition of a DAF, although the regulations under Code Section 170 discuss the "component parts
of a community trust" for public charity calculation purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 70A-9(f)(11)(ii) (as
amended in 2011). Generally, DAFs were segregated funds held by a charity pursuant to an
agreement with a donor, in which the donor reserved certain advisory rights. Bjorklund, supra note
30, at 41-42. Because the assets held in the DAF were treated as gifts to the charitable organization,
a charitable organization could maintain its public charity status because it could treat the funds in
the DAFs as public support. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 70A-9(f)(1 1). At the same time, the gift management
agreements between the sponsoring charity and the donor afforded the donor sufficient input and
information as into the charitable giving process such that the DAF could functionally mimic the
control retained by a private foundation. As a result, a DAF can function as a private foundation
substitute, while affording the donor the income tax deduction given to gifts to public charities and
the flexibility to operate free from the strictures of the private foundation excise taxes. See Wruck
Monroe, supra note 30. Moreover, because DAFs were not subject to the excess business holdings
rules of Code Section 4943 prior to 2006, a donor could transfer family business assets (such as the
stock in a family company) without limitation. Bjorklund, supra note 30. For a further discussion of
current concerns regarding DAFs, see Roger Colinvaux, The Rise of the Donor Advised Fund:
Congress Should Respond with a Payoutfor Some DAFS and New Rules for Noncash Contributions
(Catholic Univ. of Am. Columbus Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 2677297, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2677297 (providing more information on the
current concerns regarding donor advised funds).
33 The Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006), was signed into
law on August 17, 2006 [hereinafter, PPA]. The Act expanded the reach of the Code Section 4943
excess business holdings excise tax and some parts of the Code Section 4945 excise tax on
distributions for non-charitable purposes to DAFs (as well as supporting organizations). The Code
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Under this new legislation, Congress subjected DAFs and supporting organizations
to Code Section 4943's excise tax on excess business holdings.34 While Congress
did not go as far as to apply all of Code Section 4941's self-dealing rules to
supporting organizations and DAFs, it did strengthen the excess benefit transaction
rules (the public charity analog to Code Section 4941) as applied to those entities."s
As the Pension Protection Act made it more difficult to utilize the
supporting organization and the DAF to avoid the private foundation excise taxes,
more philanthropists turned to a completely different structure: the for-profit entity
with a charitable purpose.3 6 Although not the first to adopt this approach, Mark
Zuckerberg and his wife, Priscilla Chan recently made headlines when they
announced the formation of the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, LLC, a for-profit
entity dedicated to pursuing social goals." After the announcement of its creation
(on Facebook, of course), the Initiative quickly came under fire for being a forprofit entity." One of the apparent rationales for foregoing the traditional private
foundation format was that the Initiative could invest free from the restrictions

Section 4941 prohibition on self-dealing, however, was not extended to DAFs or supporting
organizations. Finally, the PPA added a provision to Code Section 4942 that limits the ability of a
private foundation to treat a distribution to a supporting organization as a qualifying distribution for
purposes of meeting its annual minimum distribution requirement. See I.R.C. § 4941(2)(g)(4) (West
2015).
34 For a brief discussion of Code Section 4943, see supra note 28.
35 The public charity rules regarding self-dealing under Code Section 4958 are more lenient than the
Code Section 4941 rules applicable to private foundations, in that they allow for arms' length
transactions. The PPA added specific provisions to Code Section 4958 for DAFs and supporting
organizations. See I.R.C. §§ 4958(c)(2), (3) (West 2015). For DAFs and supporting organizations,
grants, loans, compensation, and "similar payments" are treated as automatic excess benefits, thereby
imposing a prohibition on such transaction that would mirror the treatment such transactions would
have received under Code Section 4941. I.R.C. §§ 4958(c)(1). In addition, the PPA added two
additional excise taxes applicable to DAFs: Code Section 4966, which prohibits (but does not define)
taxable distributions, and Code Section 4967, which taxes prohibited benefits given to a DAF's
related parties. See generally I.R.C. §§ 4966, 4967 (West 2015).
36 For an in depth discussion of the for-profit entity as a philanthropic vehicle, including a case study
of Google.org, see Dana Brakman Reiser, For-ProfitPhilanthropy,77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2437, 2465
(2009).
36
See e.g. Susanna Poon, LLC vs. Foundation: Which Is the Better Optionfor Philanthropists?,FAM.
https://www.familyofice.com/insights/llc-vs-foundation-whatBLOG,
EXCHANGE
OFF.
philanthropists-best-option (last visited July 26, 2016).
3
See Mark Zuckerberg, A Letter to Our Daughter, FACEBOOK (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-letter-to-our-daughter/ 10153375081581634.
After the initial criticism of the Initiative, Mark Zuckerberg followed up with an additional Facebook
post to explain the structure of the organization, highlighting the need to be able to invest with
flexibility.
See
Mark
Zuckerberg,
FACEBOOK
(Dec.
3,
2015),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10102507695055801?fref-nf; See generally Josh Constine,
The Chan Zuckerberg Initiative's Chief of Staff Reveals Plan for Big-Bet Philanthropy,
TECHCRUNCH.COM (Dec. 11, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/12/11 /the-chan-zuckerberginitiative/.
38 See Martin Levine, Chan ZuckerbergLLC: No Tax Breaks + No Accountability = What Exactly?
(Dec. 7, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/12/07/chan-zuckerberg-llc-are-no-tax-breaksplus-no-accountability-good-for-the-public/.
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imposed by the private foundation excise taxes,39 including the investment
restrictions of Code Sections 4941 and 4943,40 as well as the political and lobbying
restrictions of Code Section 4945.41

At least until 2006, for-profit entities, DAFs and supporting organizations
avoided (in varying degrees) the imposition of the private foundation excise taxes.
At least in the case of the for-profit entities such as the Chan-Zuckerberg Initiative,
the donors are not entitled to a charitable income tax deduction upon funding the
entity, as the assets of the entity are not irrevocable dedicated to charitable
purposes. As a result, one might argue that there is no reason to regulate such a
vehicle in the same manner as the private foundation, despite the founders' stated
intention to use it to further charitable causes. Others argue that the confluence of
business and charity raises issues regarding the proper role (and regulation) of each
sector.4 2 On the other hand, transfers to both the DAF and the supporting
organization do generate assets irrevocably dedicated to charity and an income tax
deduction. As a result, the general public should be concerned about investment
restrictions on private foundations if donors are utilizing alternative vehicles in
order to avoid the discipline of these regulatory excise taxes.43
B. Private Foundation Alternative Investment Allocations
For those families that retain the traditional private foundation form for their
charitable giving, the next step is to invest the foundation's assets in a manner that is
consistent with the private foundation excise taxes as well as state law." Over at least

39

Mark
Zuckerberg,
FACEBOOK
(Dec.
3,
2015),
https://www.facebook.com/
zuck/posts/10102507695055801?fref nf; Jessica Guynn, Mark Zuckerberg: Why Chan Zuckerberg
Initiative Is an LLC, USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/12/03/markzuckerberg-explains-corporate-structure-chan-zuckerberg-initiative/76749162/; Martin Levine, Chan
ZuckerbergLLC: No Tax Breaks + No Accountability = What Exactly?, NONPROFIT QUARTERLY (Dec. 7,
2015),
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/12/07/chan-zuckerberg-llc-are-no-tax-breaks-plus-noaccountability-good-for-the-public/ (quoting Jack Blum of Tax Justice Network USA); Reiser, supra note
36, at 2453-54 (reciting similar concerns for the selection of a for-profit entity form for Google.org).
40 In addition, the jeopardizing investment excise tax of Code Section 4944 would have been
applicable.
41 Code Section 4945 imposes an excise tax on a private foundation's taxable expenditures, which is
defined to include lobbying and political activities. See I.R.C. §§ 4945(d)(1), (2) (West 2015).
42 For a good discussion of the issue of for-profit philanthropy compare Eric A. Posner & Anup
Malani, The Casefor For-ProfitCharities, (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No.
304, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=928976; with Brian Galle, Keep
Charity Charitable, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1213 (2012); Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against ForProfit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 819 (2012); and Reiser, supra note 36, at 2472 ("The forprofit philanthropy model does not just push or question the boundaries the law has placed on
philanthropy. It ignores the map altogether.").
" See, for example, the debate that occurred at a recent forum hosted by Boston College: The Rise of Donor
Advised
Funds:
Should
Congress
Respond?
(Nov.
11,
2015),
https://www.bc.edu/schools/aw/newsevents/events/philanthropy-fommlevents/donor-advised-fundsprogram-.html.
' A full discussion of the state law fiduciary duty issues that arise in private foundation investing is beyond
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the past decade, studies have shown that private foundations have steadily increased
the allocation of their portfolios to alternative investments.45 An alternative investment
is typically an asset that is not publicly traded and is not a "traditional investment" in
stocks, bonds, or cash.46 As a result, private foundations increasingly invest in limited
partnerships or LLCs as investment vehicles, 47 such as hedge funds, 48 private equity
funds, 49 or real estate investment trusts.50

&

the scope of this paper, but see generally Susan N. Gary, Is it Prudentto Be Responsible? The Legal Rules
for CharitiesthatEngage in Socially Responsible Investing andMission Investing, 6 NwJ.L. & Soc. POL'Y
106 (2011); and Susan N. Gary, FiduciaryDuties and ESG Investing, AsS'N GOVERNING BOARDS U.
Cs. TRusTEEsw MAG. (Dec. 2015), http://agb.org/trusteeship/2015/novemberdecember/fiduciary-dutiesand-esg-investing.2015 (discussing the full fiduciary duty issues that arise in private foundation investing).
45
According to the Foundation Source 2015 Report, the private foundations in its survey (which consisted of
769 ofits foundation clients, all of whom had under $50.0 million in assets) averaged 15.6% of their portfolios
in alternative investments in 2014, up from 15.2%. Even the smallest private foundations in the surveythose with under $1.0 million in assets-averaged an alternative investment allocation of 5.5% in 2014. 2015
FOUND. SOURCE, supra note 22, at 13. In Foundation Source's first Private Foundation Report in 2012, it found
that by the end of 2011, allocations to alternative strategies remained steady during the study period at roughly
14% of assets under management, however, the number of foundation between $1.0 million and $10.0 million
using alternative investment strategies rose from 41.6% at the end of 2007 to 60.1% at the end of2011. FOUND.
SOURCE, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 3 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 FOUND. SOURCE]. It
further found that use ofalternative investments increased for foundations of all sizes between 2007 and 2011,
with a marked increase for foundations with assets between $1 and $10 million. Foundations that received
little to no new funding tended to establish and pursue more aggressive allocation strategies, as all future
growth would come from investment returns. Id at 24. The Commonfund Council on Foundations 2014
Study, the study sample for which generally contains larger private foundations, shows an alternative
investment allocation of 44% for 2014, up from 42% in 2013. In contrast, community foundation allocations
went down from 27% to 25% over the same time period. COMMONFUND STUDY, supranote 24, at 17, 34-35
('[B]oth types of foundation have over time significantly increased their allocations to alternative investment
strategies and, to a lesser degree, to international equities. Both have correspondingly reduced their allocations
to domestic equities and fixed income.'")
46 See EWELINA SOKOLOWSKA, THE PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS MANAGEMENT: A

STUDY OF THE GLOBAL MARKET 1-2 (2014) ("In a broad sense, [alternative investments] are defined

as investment products, which fall outside the circle of traditional investments such as stocks, bonds,
or other money market instruments .... ).
47 See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing PartnershipProfits in Private Equity Funds, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2008) (noting the rise of the demand for private equity due to smaller
institutions, family offices and high net-worth individuals); David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of
CarriedInterests in PrivateEquity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715, 721 n.8 (2008) (citing a study by the Private
Equity Council that found that 7.7% of private equity fund investors are tax-exempt organizations
other than pension funds, while 6.8% are family offices and 10.%%.% are wealthy individuals).
48 See id. at 726. ("Traditional hedge funds engage in arbitrage-they attempt to find subtle
mispricings in securities and enter into long and short position to take advantage of the mispricings
without exposing themselves to risk. They typically purchase public securities and hold them only
for a short period."). Id. at 726.
4 See id at 721 (Private equity funds are investment funds that purchase equity positions in private
businesses. If the fund invests in new companies, it is referred to as a venture capital fund. If the
fund invests in existing companies-usually companies that require restructuring prior to resale-it
is referred to as a leveraged buyout fund.); For more on the basic workings of private equity funds,
see id at 720-27.
5o Code Section 856 defines a Real Estate Investment Trust as a "corporation, trust or association"
that meets various requirements, including a requirement that most of its income come from real
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By way of example, a traditional private equity fund might be organized
as a limited partnership.5 ' The fund's sponsors and investment managers, often
through some type of entity, act as the general partner of the partnership. The
fund's investors become limited partners to the extent of their capital
contributions-possibly in their individual capacities, or through their own family
entities. In some cases, the investment managers participate in the fund as limited
partners directly in addition to their participation through the general partner.52 The
fund typically compensates the investment managers in two ways, often referred
to colloquially as the "two and twenty."" First, the general partner receives a
management fee, which is equal to a set percentage (traditionally, 2%) of the
invested capital. In addition, the general partner also takes an incentive fee (called
a "carried interest" or a "carry"), which is a percentage (traditionally, 20%) of fund
profits. 5 These fees are in addition to the share of profits that might be allocable
to capital contributions of the general partner, if any, and the individual limited
partnership investments of the fund managers. 56
The typical equity fund has a number of limitations. An investment in a
private equity fund is usually fairly illiquid. The fund usually prohibits the limited
partners from withdrawing their investments for a significant period of time."
Thus, an investor in a private equity fund must take into account this lack of
liquidity for cash flow purposes, which can be problematic for a private foundation
that is required to distribute five percent of the fair market value of its assets
annually." The private foundation must find other sources for the cash needed to
make these required distributions. In addition, in order to deal with the federal
securities law, an equity fund often limits the number of parties investing in the
fund, and requires those parties to have a certain level of investment sophistication,
as discussed in further detail below.59

estate-related activities, dividends and interest. See 1.R.C. § 856(c) (West 2015). According to the
first Foundation Source Report, most foundation alternative investments in their study were limited
partnership interests, real estate and other real property, although there was some growth in precious
metals. 2012 FOUND. SOURCE, supra note 22, at 17.
5i See Fleischer,supra note 47, at 8. Hedge funds or private equity funds can be set up as LLCs that
are taxed as partnerships for federal tax purposes. Id.
52 Weisbach, supra note 47, at 7-9; Fleischer, supra note 47, at 8.
S3 See Fleischer, supra note 47, at 1, 8.

Weisbach, supra note 47, at 8; Fleischer, supra note 47, at 1.
s Fleischer, supra note 47, at 1, 8; Weisbach, supra note 47, at I n. 11. Traditionally, the manner in
which the 20% carried interest is calculated differs between hedge funds and private equity funds.
Id. at 723 n. 11.
54

56 Fleischer, supra note 47, at 8 ("The GP also contributes some of its own capital to the fund so that

it has some 'skin in the game.").
" See Hedge Funds:Saucefor the Goose... and the Gander?,FED. STREET ADVISORs 4,6 (July 2007),

http://www.federalstreet.com/guest-docs/HedgeFunds-andFoundations.pdf

[hereinafter

FED.

STREET ADVISORS].

" I.R.C. § 4942(a), (e).
59 FED. STREET ADVISORS, supra note 57, at 6. For a more detailed discussion of securities law issues
see infra Section II.D.
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Some commentators have decried this move toward alternative
investments in the exempt organization space.60 Certain alternative investments
can increase the amount of risk in the portfolio beyond that which was typically
seen as appropriate for charitable organizations.6 ' As described above, alternative
investments also cause significant illiquidity in the charity's portfolio, which can
impact its ability to make distributions or expenditures for charitable purposes.
Alternative investments often lack significant transparency-many hedge funds do
not make their investment holdings public, sometimes even to the limited
partners-which can cause difficulties in evaluating investment performance and
measuring asset value. 62 Finally, alternative investments should take more time
and attention to oversee than traditional investments, demanding the additional
attention of foundation managers and incurring additional investment cost. 6 3
Increased risk is not always inappropriate, however. If the charity's
investments are structured to recognize and balance this risk, alternative
investments can have an appropriate place in a diversified portfolio. Some types
of alternative investments, such as a well-run hedge fund, can actually reduce
portfolio risk if done correctly.' Structuring a portfolio to accommodate or
decrease risk and to maintain sufficient liquidity to support a charity's expenditures
requires some degree of professional expertise in nonprofit investing.6 5

Much of this debate has centered around college and university endowments and public pension
funds. See, e.g., Barry Ritholtz, The Shame ofAlternative Investments, BLOOMBERGVIEW (June 24,
2014, 8:25 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-06-24/the-shame-of-alternativeinvestments.
6' Code Section 4944 imposes an excise tax on "jeopardizing investments," which lists puts, calls,
straddles, warrants, short sales, trading on margin, commodity futures and oil and oil and gas
investments (technique often utilized by hedge funds and private equity funds) as requiring close
scrutiny. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-l(a)(2) (as amended in 1973). The Foundation Source indicated that
after the market decline of 2008, many foundations moved to less aggressive investment strategies;
however, those foundations "that did not received infusions of new capital after 2008 were more
likely to invest their assets aggressively (with heavier equity allocations)." 2012 FOUND. SOURCE,
supra note 45, at 4. After 2011, alternative investment growth "ticked up slightly" as foundations
continued to recover from 2008, but the study found that larger foundations allocated about 15% of
their assets to alternative investments, "due in part to the fact that larger foundations (or their funders)
have greater access to private equity and other alternative investments." Id. at 16.
62 See Stuart McCrary, Berkeley Research Group, Commentary: Exploring Hedge Fund
http://www.thinkbrg.com/media/publication/
2014,
J., Aug.
Transparency, WESTLAW
471_McCraryWestlawAugust2014.pdf.
63 See FED. STREET ADVISORS, supra note 57, at 3 ("It is therefore necessary to perform, or rely on a
trust consultant to perform, a thorough due diligence process that examines the hedge fund's
managers and investment process, as well as the legal structure, the organizational resources, and
features of the investment."); Despite the need for additional oversight of alternative investments, the
Commonfund Council on Foundation study showed private foundation investment committees are
smaller than counterparts at community foundations. COMMONFUND STUDY, supra note 24, at 34.
1 See Kronenberg, supranote 21, at 2; FED. STREET ADVISORS, supra note 57, at 1 (Hedge funds can
"achieve risk reduction, to the extent a selected hedge fund is uncorrelated or has low correlation
with other assets held in an investment portfolio.").
6s See Kronenberg, supra note 21, at 3 ("The 5% payout requirement should affect a foundation
manager's investment decisions. Foremost, the payout requirement will inform the decision on how
60
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Presumably, the sophisticated private foundation will be able to evaluate whether
alternative investing makes sense as a matter of risk/return and as a matter of
administrative cost and attention. 66
C. Foundation Investments Managed by Family Offices
A family foundation may utilize the services of a family office 67 to select
and oversee the foundation's investments, including its alternative investments. In
such circumstances, investment opportunities likely come from a common source:
the family's outside investment professionalS 68 or family office investment staff.69
As a result, all of the family members and entities affiliated with the foundation
may be looking at and participating in the same investment opportunities.
According to some studies, single-family offices hold about $1.2 trillion in assets,
while multi-family offices manage about $500 billion in assets.70 "Some market
experts say family offices are similar to what hedge funds were in the early
1990s-lightly regulated investment vehicles for the wealthy that can make big
bets on markets, but remain out of the public spotlight."71
The family office is typically structured as a business entity (often a
partnership or LLC taxed as a partnership) owned by various related family
members. The family office then employs staff that can handle a variety of the
family's needs-everything from basic bookkeeping, bill payment, and tax
preparation to the identification and management of the family's overall

much should be allocated to equities, fixed income, and alternative assets.").
66
67

See generally FED. STREET ADVISORS, supra note 57.

A "family office" can refer to a family-controlled investment and administrative group. See Julie

Steinberg & Kelly Greene, FinancialAdvice, Served Rare, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 17, 2013),

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323551004578441002331568618
("Family
offices are private firms that manage just about everything for the wealthiest families: tax planning,
investment management, estate planning, philanthropy, art and wine collections-cven the family
vacation compound.").
68 Russ Alan Prince, Family Offices Are Successful Middle-Market Investors, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2014,
6:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/russalanprince/2014/12/01/family-offices-are-successfulmiddle-market-investors/ ("[T]he majority of direct investment opportunities are brought to family
offices through the financial and legal professional in their networks."); Margaret Collins, Family
Offices Team Up Taking Page From Private Equity, BLOOMBERG (May 28, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-28/family-offices-team-up-taking-page-fromprivate-equity ("About 22 percent of family offices had three or more people in their office tasked
with the sourcing, screening, monitoring and exiting of direct investments in 2010, according to a
survey by McNally's firm. That percentage has almost doubled as of this year to 37 percent, said
McNally."). "Still, there are now more than 1,000 family offices in the United States, according to
an estimate from the Wharton Family Office Alliance
."Robert Frank, Introducing the New
Hedge Fund:
The
Family Office,
CNBC
(June
5,
2013,
10:36
AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100791423.
69 COMMONFUND STUDY, supra note 24, at 48-58.
o Collins, supra note 68 (citing Bob Casey, senior managing director for research at consulting
firm Family Wealth Alliance).
1 Frank, supra note 68.
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investment portfolio. This allows the family to achieve economies of scale for
certain services and projects.7 2 In some cases, these costs are shared; in others,
direct costs can be allocated to specific family members. Related family entities
can contract for services from the family office in a manner designed to allocate
costs and to track fees by entity cost centers.
Some family offices manage the family's investments through
arrangements with third party advisors and managers. The more recent trend
involves the family office actually creating the fund itself. " In this way, the family
reduces costs, and the family can tailor fund holdings to the family's needs. Taken
to the most sophisticated level, the family office can create multiple funds, each
focused on a particular style of investing: growth versus value, small cap versus
large cap, etc.74 Each family member would then participate in selected funds to
the extent necessary for the family member to reach a desired portfolio allocation.75
Thus, a family's generation skipping trust designed to benefit multiple future
generations would invest in the family investment funds that would create a long
term growth portfolio allocation, while a trust for the benefit of an elderly family
member might invest in only those family investment funds that would produce
short term income.
D. Securities Law Issues and the Family Office
Use of the family office as an investment vehicle benefits the family and
its foundation by providing economies of scale, lower fees, and familiarity with
individual investment styles, especially in the alternative investment space.
Investing in this manner raises obvious tax questions, but it also implicates federal
and state securities regulation. While a full overview of the applicable securities
laws is beyond the scope of this Article,76 it is important to understand some of the

72 Collins, supra note 68. Investing together or forming a partnership to take a stake in an investment

results in lower fees and a better understanding of the businesses in which the family invests. Family
offices can allocate due diligence duties and utilize expertise to maximize resources.
" There is a recent trend of family offices teaming up to coordinate direct investments (rather than
through managed funds) as well, in order to share information and reduce fees. Antoine Drean,
Individual Investors and Family Offices Are the Rising Power in Private Equity, FORBES (July 28,
2015, 11:39 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinedrean/2015/07/28/individual-investors-and-

family-offices-are-the-rising-power-in-private-equity/#64c286795663

(stating that family offices

account for 8% of the world's $4.0 trillion in private equity assets under management, double the
share of five years ago).
74 See generally Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen & P. Raghavendra Rau, Changing Names with
Style: Mutual Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows, 60 J. FIN. 2825 (2005).
7 For a non-economic view of style selection see Henrik Cronqvist, Stephan Siegel, & Frank Yu,
Value Versus Growth Investing: Why Do Diferent Investors Have Different Styles?, 117 J. FIN. ECON.
333 (2015) (discussing personal factors influencing an investor's style selection).
6 This

article by necessity will only briefly discuss some applicable federal securities laws and will

not discuss the various state securities law regimes. Most states have a parallel system of securities
regulation that requires independent analysis. See Blue Sky Laws, SEC. EXCH COMM'N (Oct. 14,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm. Each state's own set of securities laws, commonly
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potential benefits accruing to the private foundation and its disqualified persons
from securities law compliance perspective. Two key elements of the securities
laws at issue are those that regulate the office itself and the advice that the office
(or its employees) can give, and those that regulate the investments themselves.
The Investment Advisors Act of 194077 (the "IAA") generally provides
that individuals who provide investment advice"8 to the public for compensation
must register with the SEC7 9 and meet certain minimum standards,o unless an
exemption applies. While there is an exception for general advice on planning and
administrative assistance, advice regarding individual securities will generally
implicate the provisions of the IAA. Because many family offices provide
individualized advice regarding specific securities to family members, related
business entities, and (of course) the family's private foundation, each family
office must consider whether it is an investment advisor under the IAA.
Registration and continuous reporting8' as an investment advisor under the IAA is
expensive, time-consuming, and limiting; as a result, family offices and their
investment professionals would rather avoid registering under the IAA, all other
things being equal.82
Prior to 2011 (and, importantly, at the time that the IRS issued the PLRs),
the SEC took the position that an individual giving investment advice to a limited
number of clients was exempt from registration under the so-called "private
adviser" exemption. 83 The SEC interpreted the private adviser exemption to

.

referred to as "Blue Sky Laws," are designed "to protect investors against fraudulent sales practices
and activities." Id. Although these laws vary from state to state, most Blue Sky Laws require
companies to make offerings of securities to register their offerings before they can be sold in a
particular state (unless a specific state exemption is available). Id.
n1 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-21 (West 2015) [hereinafter IAA].
78 Id. § 202(a)(1 1). IAA Section 202(a)(1 1) defines an investment advisor to include "any person
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others .... as to the value of securities
or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities .
7
1Id. § 203(c)(1).
80 Id §§ 205, 206. For example, IAA Section 205 contains requirements for investment advisor
contracts, while IAA Section 206 enumerates certain prohibited transactions.
81 Id. § 204. See IAA Section 204 for investment adviser reporting requirements.
82 Collins, supra note 68 (explaining "[fl"amilies should consider setting up a separate entity for
these co-investments ... to make sure their entire family offices aren't forced to register as investment
advisers and therefore reveal financial details."; see also Ryan M. Harding & Elise J. McGee, To
Register or Not? SEC Investment Adviser Guidancefor "FamilyOffices, "PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct.
2012, at 22 (stating that registering a family office as an investment advisor would be an "unattractive
outcome.").
8 IAA § 203(b)(3) (prior to 2011 Dodd Frank amendments); see also Harding & McGee, supra note
82, at 22. Additionally, the SEC has the authority to exempt parties from the tAA if it was consistent
with the purposes of the act. Under this authority, the SEC did issue exemptions to family offices
that may have had more than fifteen clients due to the presence of a former employee, a charitable
entity, or like clients. See Audrey C. Talley, Family Offices: Securities and Commodities Law Issues,
34 ACTEC J. 284, 286 (2009) (citing Donner Estates, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 21,
1941 WL 37202 (Nov. 3, 1941)); see also Family Offices, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983 (June 29, 2011) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/201 1/ia-3220fr.pdf [hereinafter
Family Offices Final Rule] ("Historically, family offices that fell outside the private adviser
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provide that an adviser did not have to register under the IAA if that adviser had
less than fifteen clients.' The tricky part was how to count clients in a family office
setting.8 ' The SEC, in interpreting the private adviser provision, grouped certain
related parties: spouses and minor children, for example, could be treated as one
client.86 Typically, individually organized entities were treated as different
clients.87 Importantly, it was not necessary to count any entity for whom
investment services were provided without compensation; accordingly, if the
family office provided advice free of charge, then the private foundation did not
count as a client. 8 For those with an extensive family tree and a complicated trust
and investment entity structure, the family office could reach fifteen separate
(albeit related) clients relatively quickly. Reaching fifteen clients would be a
virtual certainty for a multi-family office.
Under the pre-2011 rule, a family office had to be cautious about the
number of entities to which it gave investment advice. On the one hand, this limit
would advise against creating multiple legal entities (such as investment
partnerships among family members) if those entities could not be aggregated with,
one another under the fifteen client rule. On the other hand, if various potential
clients could be aggregated in a single entity structure, and the family office
provided investment advice to that entity only, it could reduce the number of
"clients" counted under the old rule. Including a private foundation and other
entities in an investment partnership, and then counting the investment partnership
itself as the client, the partnership might benefit the family office and the family if
it ultimately allowed the family office to avoid registration.
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the IAA to remove the private
advisor exemption of Section 203(b). 89 In its place, however, the Dodd-Frank Act
added Clause (G) to Section 202(a)(1 1) (the definition of an investment advisor),
which now specifically provides that an investment advisor does not include "any
family office, as defined by rule, regulation, or order of the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission . . . ."9 Under the SEC's new family office rules, 9 1 an
advisor does not need to register under the IAA if all of the family office's clients

exemption have sought and obtained from us orders under the Advisers Act declaring those offices
not to be investment advisors . . . .").
84 IAA § 203(b)(3); Harding & McGee, supra note 82, at 22.
8s
86

See Talley, supra note 83.

17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(a)(i) (2015) provides that for purposes of IAA Section 203(b)(3), a
single client includes a natural person, their minor children, their spouse or other relatives who share
the same principal residence, and accounts and trust of which those persons are the primary
beneficiaries.
1 Id The SEC allowed the aggregation of separate legal organizations as a single client if they had
identical owners. Id. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(a)(iii).
88 Id. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(b)(4).
8
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376,
1571 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
90 IAA § 202(a)(1 1)(G); Dodd-Frank Act § 409.
91 Family Offices Final Rule, supra note 83. Proposed rules were issued on October 12, 2010. See
Family Offices, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753 (proposed Oct. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 75 C.F.R. pt. 275).
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are members of the same family, the family clients own and control the family
office, and the family office does not hold itself out to the public as an investment
advisor.92 While the new rules specifically disallow the provision of investment
advice to multi-family offices or to clients who are not family members, 9 3 a private
foundation can be a family client if other family clients provide all of the
foundation's funding.94
Under the new rule, a private foundation will not be related if accepted and
holds non-family contributions.. Unless the private foundation purges itself of
those non-family contributions,95 it would be an unrelated party and therefore,
would not be treated as an acceptable client for purposes of the IAA exception. In
such a scenario, the family office must choose to either (1) no longer provide the
private foundation with investment advice, or (2) register under the IAA. Either
choice would have a significant impact on both the family and the private
foundation. If the private foundation were to receive independent advice, it would,
of course, need to pay for it. Moreover, to the extent that the family benefitted from
the participation of the foundation in family investment opportunities, those
benefits would be lost. The family and the foundation would lose the benefit of
being able to pool resources to make larger investments or meet the minimum
investment requirements of particular funds. If the family office chose to register
due to the continuing participation of the private foundation, it would need to deal
with the question of how to allocate the cost associated with that registration.
Under the self-dealing rules, any agreement between the private foundation and its
disqualified persons to share these costs would be itself an act of self-dealing.
Thus, it would seem that the costs associated with IAA registration would need to
be borne by the disqualified persons as a cost of keeping the private foundation
within the investment fold.
The second set of securities laws apply to the investments themselves. The
Securities Act of 193396 (the "1933 Act") generally requires the registration of all
offers and sales of securities, absent an applicable exemption.9 7 As with the
registration provisions of the IAA, registering a security for offering can be a timeconsuming and expensive proposition. As a result, there are a number of
exceptions to the 1933 Act's registration requirements; investment opportunities
are often structured to qualify for these exemptions.
The 1933 Act exempts from registration certain non-public offerings of
securities, sometimes involving a limited dollar amount or a limited number or

92

Family Offices Final Rule, supra note 83, at 37,984.

93 Id. There is a limited exception for the provision of advice to non-family members who are key

employees.
94 Id. at 37,987; see also IAA § 202(a)(1 1)(G)-l(d)(4)(v).
95 The Final Family Office Rule 202(a)(1 l)(G)-l(e)(1) contain specific transition rules in this regard.
Family Offices Final Rule, supra note 83, at 37, 988.
96 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (West 2015) [hereinafter 1933 Act].
9' The terms "offer," "sale" and "securities" all have extraordinarily broad definitions. See THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (CONCISE HORNBOOK SERIES) (3d ed. 2009).
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type of purchaser. 98 Regulation D 99 describes the exemptions from the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act for private placements. Section 506 of Regulation D
contains the primary exemptions from registration. Section 506(b) provides that a
sale of securities is exempt from registration if: there are no more than 35
purchasers' 00 and each purchaser is an accredited investor,101 or can demonstrate
that they have the knowledge and experience to evaluate the investment
properly.102
Alternatively, Section 506(c) of Regulation D exempts offerings with an
unlimited number of investors, but all of the investors must be verified "accredited
investors" within the meaning of the 1933 Act and Regulation D.1 03
Under Regulation D, an accredited investor includes a Section 501(c)(3)
organization (such as a private foundation), or a corporation or partnership, that
was not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring securities, and in each case,
having assets in excess of $5.0 million.' 0 4 For corporations and partnerships with
over $5.0 million in assets, each individual owner of the entity does not need to be
an accredited investor; the Regulation merely requires that the corporation or\
partnership not be formed for the purposes of acquiring the securities offered.'i 5 A.
corporation or partnership with under $5.0 million in assets will only be an
accredited investor if all of its equity owners are accredited investors
individually.' 0 6 For purposes of counting investors, a corporation or partnership is
counted as one purchaser unless it is formed for the purpose of acquiring the
offered securities and it is not an accredited investor in and of itself. In that case,
each beneficial owner is treated as a separate investor. 0 7
For a family wishing to enter into any transaction that intends to qualify
as a private placement, participation of a private foundation may be important. A
larger private foundations will be an accredited investor by virtue of having over.

98

The statutory dollar limitation is currently $5.0 million, and has been at the time of the PLRs and

since 1980, when it was increased from $2.0 million. 1933 Act § 3(b)(1). For example, Regulation
D has special exemption provisions for sales under $1.0 million (530.504) and $5.0 million
(230.505).
" See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (The SEC rules are safe harbors and are not the exclusive ways
of conducting a private placement. These safe harbors are frequently relied upon by sellers and
investors, however, because they are predictable and provide a level of certainty to the transaction.).

'" 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2013); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (giving the rules regarding
counting the number of purchasers).

'0 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
102

Id.

1o3 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2).
104 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5), (6) (In addition, a natural person
and his or her spouse with assets of over $1.0 million or who has income in excess of $200,000
($300,000 with a spouse) is an accredited investor.).
105 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(2) (Providing that if an "entity is organized for the specific purpose of
acquiring the securities offered and is not an accredited investor" because all of its equity owners are
accredited investors, then each equity is treated as" a separate purchaser for all provisions of
Regulation D."

106 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(8).
107 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e).
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$5.0 million in assets.o8 The private foundation may be able to contribute
sufficient assets to an investment partnership to qualify the partnership itself as an
accredited investor; other family members investing with the private foundation in
the investment partnership need not be accredited investors if the partnership holds
over $5.0 million and assets and was not formed solely to take part in the offering.
Not only does this assist the family members that might not otherwise qualify as
accredited investors, but it assists the issuer (who may also be a related party in
some of these situations), who may only be able to allow a limited number of nonaccredited investors (if any) into an investment.1 09
As these two examples demonstrate, a private foundation may find itself
investing in an alternative investment not because it is in the best interests of the
private foundation, but because it will benefit other family members from a cost,
opportunity, and compliance standpoint.
II. PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS AND CHAPTER 42
A. Private Foundations, Generally
The Internal Revenue Code places a number of restrictions on the ability
of charitable organizations to invest their assets in concert with affiliated parties;
however, only private foundations are subject to the restrictions of Chapter 42 and
specifically, Code Section 4941.
Code Section 501(c)(3) exempts from federal income taxation entities that
are organized and operated exclusively for charitable and other tax-exempt
purposes."o Organizations described in Code Section 501(c)(3) are further
subdivided into two categories: private foundations and public charities."' A Code
Section 501(c)(3) organization is deemed to be a private foundation unless it
proves that it is entitled to public charity status.1' 2 There are, essentially, three
categories of organizations that qualify for public charity status: certain
organization deemed to be automatically public (such as churches, hospitals, and

§ 230.501(a)(3) (treating Section 501(c)(3) organizations with over $5.0 million in
assets as accredited investors). Although see the discussion infra, II.B., of the increase in the
percentage allocation of investments to alternative for even small private foundations.
108 17 C.F.R.

109 See generally STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND

ANALYSIS (4th ed. 2015) ("In practice, most offerings [under Rules 505 and 506] are sold exclusively
to accredited investors."); see also Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The
Unintended (andBad) Outcomes for the SC's Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 THE BUs. LAWYER 919
(2011); Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC's Continuing Failureto
Address Small Business FinancingConcerns, 4 NYU J.L. Bus. 1 (2007).
110 See generally Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, Better Late Than Never: IncorporatingLLCS Into
Section 4943, 48 AKRON L. REV. 485 (2015). Technically, Section 501(a) confers the exemption on
organizations described in Section 501(c), including Section 501(c)(3).
'" I.R.C. § 509(a) (West 2015).
112 Id.
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schools);"' organizations with a broad base of public support, as determined by
one of two mathematical tests; 1 14 and supporting organizations, which are
organizations that were created for the purpose of benefitting one or more other
public charities. If an organization does not fall into one of these categories, it is
treated as a private foundation. Typically, a private foundation holds a substantial
endowment of investment assets that it obtained from a single person or family,
the income from which is used to make grants for charitable purposes.' 15
There are significant consequences that arise from being characterized as
being a private foundation rather than a public charity." 6 One of the most serious
of these consequences is that private foundations are subject to the private
foundation excise tax regime found in Chapter 42 of the Code."' These excise
taxes, found in Code Sections 4940 to 4948, significantly impact all aspects of the
administration of a private foundation, including the investment of its assets.
B. The Private Foundation Excise Taxes
In 1950,s18 Congress enacted a number of reforms in the exempt
organization area, including Code Section 503 regarding related party
transactions. 1 9 The original House legislation intended simply to prohibit private
foundations from entering into certain related party transactions.1 20 The Senate
Finance committee substantially softened the House's absolute prohibition,
allowing arm's-length dealings between private foundations and its related

113 I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), (a)(4), 170(b)(A)(i)-(v) (West 2015). It also includes organizations that test
for public safety.
114 I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1)-(2), 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (West 2015). Donor advised funds are not in and of
themselves Section 501(c)(3) organizations; however, they are typically accounts or funds sponsored

by Section 501(c)(3) organizations that qualify as public charities because the charity meets one of

the mathematical tests. For a more detailed discussion of donor advised funds see supra pp. 7-8.
11 According to the Council on Foundations, in 2011 there were 73,764 private foundations with
more than $604.0 billion in assets and more than $45.0 billion in annual giving. PrivateFoundations,
COUNCIL ON FOUND. (Feb. 21, 2016), http://www.cof.org/foundation-type/private-foundations.
"6 See generally I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(D), (e) (West 2015). Classification as a private foundation may
also have a negative impact on a donor's charitable income tax deduction under Section 170. Very
generally, a donor's income tax deduction is subject to a number of limitations, including an annual
limitation in allowable deduction based on the donor's adjusted gross income and a decrease in the
amount of the charitable deduction for appreciated property. For gifts to private foundation, a donor's
deduction may be limited to 20% of the donor's adjusted gross income (as opposed to 50% or 30%
for gifts to or the use of a public charity) and the donor's deduction may be limited to basis of certain
types of appreciated property (as opposed to fair market value reduced by short term capital gain for
gifts of appreciated property to a public charity); see also Wilson, supra note 110.
117 I.R.C. §§ 4940-4948 (West 2015).
" The Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, 64 Stat. 906. (1950).
119 I.R.C. § 503 (West 1954).
I See H.R. Rep. No. 2319, at 42 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 412; Thomas A. Troyer, The
1969 Private FoundationLaw: HistoricalPerspective on Its Origins and Underpinnings,27 TAX'N
OF EXEMPTS 4 (2000).
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parties. 121 As a result, then Code Section 503 loosely regulated transactions
between private foundations and its affiliates. 122 Under these rules, a trust holding
amounts for charitable purposes could not, among other things, lend without
"adequate security" and a "reasonable rate of interest"; make "substantial
purchases" of property for more than "adequate consideration;" or engage in any
other transaction that would result in a "substantial diversion" of assets to the
grantor, their family members, or certain controlled corporations.1 2 3
The language of Code Section 503 allowed for a significant amount of
ambiguity and discretion. "Adequate" consideration and "substantial" diversions
were not defined by the statute itself. One commentator noted that the "statutory
standards are either very vague or . . . so specific as to be relatively useless. . . ."124

Enforcement of such provision by the IRS was a case-by-case, fact specific, and
time intensive endeavor1 25 that, as a practical matter, would "depend, in the last
analysis, upon the dictates of conscience of philanthropists."' 2 6
As it became clear that the reforms of 1950 were not sufficient to stop
private foundations abuses,1 2 7 congressional scrutiny of the private foundation
sector intensified. In 1961, Representative Wright Patman initiated a survey of 534
private foundations, which formed the basis of the Patman Report, a multi-volume
study cataloguing a myriad of private foundation of abuses.1 28 Patman argued that

Id. at 7.
Id The concept of the private foundation does not technically become a part of the Internal
Revenue Code until 1969; however, Section 503 of the 1954 Code was limited in application to
basically what would be private foundations currently, which would form the outlines of the private
foundation/public charity distinction when it does officially become part of the Code. When the
private foundation excise taxes were passed in 1969, Code Section 503 was amended to apply only
to a select number of non-charitable exempt organizations. See I.R.C. § 503(a)(1)(2015) (applicable
to organizations described in 501cl 7 and 501cl8 (certain supplemental compensation and employee
benefit trusts) and certain government and church retirement plans described in § 401(a) and either
§§ 4975(g)(2) or (3)).
123 Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, § 321, 64 Stat. 906, 954-6; compare I.R.C. § 503 (West
1954), with I.R.C. § 503(b) (West 2015).
124 Troyer, supra note 120, at 11 (citing Young, Donor FoundationDealings, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON
FED. TAX 965, 1006 (1964)).
125 S. COMM. ON FIN., 89TH CONG., REP. ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONs 6 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter
1965 REPORT] ("Fourteen years of experience have demonstrated that the imprecision of this statute
makes the law difficult and expensive to administer, hard to enforce in litigation, and otherwise
insufficient to prevent abuses."); Id. at 18 (Private foundation examinations under Code Section 503
were "require the skill of highly trained revenue agents and are both time consuming and
expensive.").
126 Troyer, supra note 120, at 11-12 (citing Young, supra note 124, at 1006).
127 In its explanation of the 1969 Act, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation states that
one of the reasons for the prohibition on self-dealing was "to minimize the need to apply subjective
arm's-length standards." Troyer, supra note 120, at 27 (quoting STAFF OF JOiNT COMM. ON INTERNAL
REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 30-31
(Comm. Print 1970)).
128 The results of the Patman hearings were published in three separate installments (the "Patman
121

122

Reports"). CHAIRMAN'S REPORT TO H. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., TAXEXEMPT
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the lost tax revenues attributable to the tax-exempt status of private foundationsl 29
were not justified by the charitable use of the assets held by those foundations,
because the donor families and corporations could
by a loan or exchange, secure a return of assets that have been
donated should the occasion arise, that he can secure additional
capital when needed, at "reasonable" rates; that foundation funds
have been used to help a donor when he found himself in a proxy
fight; and foundation funds have been used to confer benefits on
employees of companies, a substantial competitive advantage. 3 0
The Patman report clearly discusses abusive self-dealing transactions such
as foundation lending to insiders at favorable rates, capital investments in family
entities, use of foundation services on a preferable basis, and sales that were not at
fair market value,"' as well as more subtle types of self-dealing, such as proxy
fight behavior 32 and investment selection.'3 3
On the heels of the Patman report, the Senate Finance Committee in 1964
directed that the Treasury study private foundations, stating that it believed that
foundation assets were being invested and "the advantages arising from control of
these investments [were] likely to inure to the principal contributors to the
foundations."'3 4 The resulting Treasury report, released in 1965, echoed many of
the concerns identified by the Patman report.' 35
The 1965 Report identified subtle benefits inuring to the benefit of private
parties engaged in investment transactions.136 A foundation manager might change
the investment of a foundation' 3 7 or delay distributions if he knew that the liquidity
might be used to make a loan to his personal business.' 8 Evan if a loan to a

INSTALLMENT (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter PATMAN REPORT OR FIRST INSTALLMENT];
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT TO H. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 88TH CONG., TAX-EXEMPT
FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY, SECOND INSTALLMENT
(Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter PATMAN REPORT 2 OR SECOND INSTALLMENT]; CHAIRMAN'S REPORT
To H. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 88TH CONG., TAx-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND
CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY, THIRD INSTALLMENT (Comm. Print 1963)
[hereinafter PATMAN REPORT 3 OR THIRD INSTALLMENT].
29
PATMAN REPORT, supra note 128, at vi.
30

1

Id

131

Id. at 16.

132

I

1

33

Id.

"' Troyer, supra note 120, at 14-15 (quoting S. REP. No. 88-830, at 60 (1964)).
135 At least one commentator, however, referred to the "general tenor of the Treasury Report [as] one
of moderation." Marcus Schoenfeld, Initial Impressions of the Treasury Report on Foundations, 14
CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 286, 286 (1965).
"6 1965 REPORT, supra note 125, at 15 (The Report notes that donors often continue to think of
foundation assets as their money, and therefore should be handled in the manner the donor wishes,
rather than in a manner that furthers charitable purposes.).
i37 Id. at 16.
...
Id. at 15.
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disqualified person carried an adequate interest rate and security, the private
foundation would likely not require a detailed financial statement, ask
"embarrassing questions," or delay the loan while an application was pending.' 39
Such benefits, while "intangible," provided the donor with a "substantial and
valuable benefit."
The 1965 Report further noted that "when a person is asked to represent
two conflicting interests in the same transaction it is likely that he will, consciously
or unconsciously, favor one side over the other." One of the examples of selfdealing noted in the 1965 Report involved a contribution of "blue chip" stock to
the foundation, which was immediately sold and the proceeds used to buy stock in
the donor's business from family members. 4 0 Thus, the 1965 Report clearly
identified as an act of self-dealing any investment decision made on behalf of the
Foundation that was not for the benefit of the foundation and its charitable
endeavors, but to further the interests of the family.141
The Treasury noted that the rationale for keeping an arm's length
transaction standard, in lieu of an absolute prohibition, was that "the charity
benefits from allowing a donor to deal with 'his' foundation and that this benefit
is so substantial and important that it warrants the high cost of administering
existing law." The Treasury found, however, that the "inherent potential for private
benefit. . . the cost of enforcing an arm's length standard, and ... the damage to
the confidence of all taxpayers in the fairness of the tax law" far outweighed any
"isolated cases" of benefit to the charity.1 4 2 Rather, the 1965 Report set out the
following fundamental principal:
[I]t is better to forbid self-dealing and to strike down all such
transactions rather than to attempt to separate those transactions
which are harmful from those which are not by permitting a
fiduciary (as is the donor when he is dealing with charitable funds)
to justify his representation of two interests.1 43
With the Patman Report and the 1965 Treasury Report as background,
Congress took up the issues of legislative reform in the area of private foundations

139 1965 REPORT, supra note 125, at 15-16.
140 Id at 20 (Example 11); see also id (example 12, where retention of a repurchase option in the

donor's children forced a foundation to retain stock and not invest the assets that could have provided
more income for distribution while reducing risk of loss).
141 See Schoenfeld, supra note 135, at 288 ("For example, the investment and distribution policies of
the foundation may be determined so as to best serve the needs of the donor rather than the needs of
the charity.").
142 1965 REPORT, supra note 125, at 20-21, 23. The Report notes that "since a foundation may choose
from a wide range of possible investments, it is not necessary for it to invest in the business of its
donor, or to lend him any money. Similarly, a party who engages in transactions with the foundation
on a truly arm's-length basis could, by definition, engage in the same transactions, on the same terms,
with strangers."
143 Id
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in 1969.i" Specifically with regard to the existing prohibited transaction rules of
Code Section 503, the Joint Committee stated that
the imprecise restrictions in present law against unwarranted
private advantage, delay in benefits to charity and participation by
private foundations in business have been difficult and expensive
to administer, hard to enforce in litigation, and otherwise
insufficient to prevent these abuses.1 45
Accordingly, in 1969 Congress enacted the private foundation excise taxes
of Chapter 42 of the Code, specifically including Code Section 4941. Code Section
4941 now prohibits all self-dealing transactions (subject to limited statutory
exceptions), even ifthose transactions are fair and reasonable to the foundation and
at or below fair market value. Thus, the self-dealing statute passed in 1969 (for the
most part) 4 6 avoided provisions based on "adequate," "reasonable," or
"substantial" transactions; rather, a new strict liability approach would provide
private foundations with definitive guidance and the IRS with ease of
administration.
Code Section 4941 was not the only excise tax in 1969 that addressed
private foundation investments. Simultaneously, Congress enacted Code Section
4944, which prohibits a private foundation from entering into jeopardizing
investments 4 7 and Code Section 4943, which limits the amount of an equity
interest that a private foundation may own in an operating business enterprise.' 48
While Code Section 4943 has a number of independent justifications, one rationale
for the limitation on the ability to own operating businesses in junction with its
related parties was because "opportunities are created for self-dealing in forms too
subtle for the specific prohibitions" set forth in Code Section 4941.149

" Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
295
(Comm. Print 1969).
146 Note that one important exception to the definition of an act of self-dealing is "reasonable"
compensation, described more fully infra Section IID.
147 I.R.C. § 4944 (West 2015).
148 Id. § 4943.
149 Id. at 296; see also 1965 REPORT, supra note 125, at 34 ("Temptation for subtle and varied forms
of self-dealing proliferate [with business ownership.] Remote relatives may be employed in the
business; friends may be assisted; business acquaintances may be accommodated. However broadly
drawn the restrictions upon self-dealing may be, many of the conflicts of interest arising in this area
are likely to be sufficiently obscure or sufficiently beyond the realm of reasonable definition to escape
the practical impact of the limitations.").
145 JOINT PUBL'N COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 91ST CONG., TAx REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS
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C. Code Section 4941's Excise Tax on Self-Dealing
Code Section 4941 imposes an excise tax on each "act of self-dealing
between a private foundation and disqualified person." 50 In general, the excise tax
is imposed on the self-dealer; however, if a foundation manager's participation in
the transaction is willful and not due to reasonable cause, an excise tax can be
imposed on the foundation manager as well.' 5 ' In either case, acts of self-dealing
that are not corrected in a timely manner are subject to an additional 200% excise
tax.1 52 This excise tax is not voluntary-it is not a transaction cost to be factored
into the decision as to whether to undertake a transaction. Rather, it is intended to
police private foundation actions and effectively to prohibit all covered selfdealing transactions.
In order to have an act of self-dealing under Code Section 4941, there must
be (1) a self-dealing transaction described in the statute that is not subject to an
exemption, and (2) that transaction must occur between a private foundation and a
"disqualified person."
1. Disqualified Persons
In order to trigger the Code Section 4941 excise tax, an act of selfdealing'5 3 must occur between a private foundation and a disqualified person.' 54
The term "disqualified person" is defined in Code Section 4946 to include the
following: 5 5 Foundation managers; 5 6 substantial contributors to the private
foundation;'.. if a substantial contributor to the private foundation is an entity, then

no I.R.C. § 4941(a)(1) (West 2015).
151 Id § 4941(a)(2). A foundation manager is defined as an officer, director or trustee of a private
foundation (or person having similar powers and responsibilities, regardless oftitle), or any employee
of a foundation that has the authority or responsibility to act (or not act) with regard to a specific

transaction. See also I.R.C. § 4946(b) (West 2015).
152 Id. § 4941(b). Of course, acts of self-dealing can also rise to the level of prohibited private
inurement, which can cause loss of tax-exemption under Section 501 (c)(3). Id. § 501 (c)(3). It is
possible, however, to have an act of self-dealing that is not an act of private inurement, since a fair
market value transaction between a private foundation and a disqualified person may be an act of

self-dealing under Section 4941 but would not cause private inurement under Section 501(c)(3). See
infra Part Ill.C.2.
153 For a more detailed discussion of the definition of an act of self-dealing and its statutory and
regulatory exceptions, see infra Part III.C.2. and Part III.C.3.
154 See l.R.C. § 4941(a)(1)-(2) (West 2015).

15s Id. § 4946(a)(1). In addition to those listed above, the term "disqualified person" also includes
certain related private foundations solely for the purpose of Code Section 4943, and certain
government officials solely for the purpose of Code Section 4941. Id. § 4946(a)(1)(H), (1).
156 Id. § 4946(a)(1)(B); see id. § 4946(b) (A foundation manager is "an officer, director, or trustee of
a foundation (or an individual having powers or responsibilities similar to those of officers, directors,
or trustees of the foundation), and with respect to any act (or failure to act), the employees of the
foundation having authority or responsibility with respect to such act (or failure to act)").
11 Id. § 4946(a)(1)(A). A substantial contributor is defined as any person who contributes or
bequeaths an aggregate amount in excess of $5,000 if that amount is more than 2% of the foundations
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any owner of 20% of more of that substantial contributor (herein, a "20%
Owner"); 1 8 any member of the family of a foundation manager, a substantial
contributor, or a 20% Owner;15 9 entities 35% of which are owned by any
combination of foundation managers, substantial contributors, 20% Owners, and
members of the family of such individuals (herein, a "35% Controlled Entity").
For purposes of determining ownership1 60 under both the 20% Owner rule
and the 35% Controlled Entity rule, the owner of a corporation is determined with
reference with voting power;i1i the owner of a partnership is determined with
referenced to profits interest,1 6 2 and the owner of a trust or other unincorporated
enterprisel63 is determined by virtue of beneficial interest.1 64
As a result of the technical interlocking definitions of disqualified person,
many individuals and family entities can unwittingly become disqualified persons
with respect to a family foundation. For private foundations, one of the first tasks
at hand is simply to identify the world of individuals and entities that constitute its
disqualified persons.16 ' For the family foundation, the definition draws in any
number of family business and estate planning entities that the family might not,
otherwise consider to be related to the foundation in any way

total contributions received during the tax year. It also includes the creator of trust. Id. § 507(d)(2).
158 Id. § 4946(a)(1)(C).
159
Id. § 4946(a)(1)(D). A member of the family is defined by Code Section 4946(d) as an individual's
spouse and ancestors, as well as the individual's children, grandchildren, great grandchildren, and
their spouses. Note that the definition of members of the family does not include spouses of ancestors,
descendants beyond great-grandchildren, or siblings and their descendants and spouses. Compare id.
§ 4958(f)(4) (including siblings).
in In addition, in determining ownership, Code Sections 4946(a)(3) and (4) required the application
of some of the principles of Code Section 267, includes certain rules attributing stock ownership to
family members, which often are referenced in parts of the Code where special rules for intra-family
transactions are necessary. When applying the 20% Owner and 35% Controlled Entity rule to
corporate interests, stock ownership includes indirect holdings in a corporation that would be taken
into account under Code Section 267(c). Id. § 4946(a)(3). Similarly, the ownership of partnership
profits or beneficial interests in trusts or other unincorporated entities is determined under the
constructive stock ownership rules of Code Section 267(c). Id § 4946(a)(4).
161 I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(C)(i) (West 2015).
162 Id. § 4946(a)(1)(C)(ii).
163 Application of the Chapter 42 excise taxes to LLCs is somewhat unclear, given that LLCs did not
exist at the time that the excise taxes were enacted. See generally Wilson, supra note 110, at 492.
i` I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(C)(iii).
165

See

COUNCIL

ON

FOUNDs.,

STEWARDSHIP

PRINCIPLES

FOR

FAMILY

FOUNDATIONS

4,

http://www.cof.org/sites/default/files/documents/files/FamilyStewardship%20Principles.pdf
("Document the affiliations or involvement of board members, grantmaking staff and their families
with potential grantees . . . "); Benjamin T. White, Avoiding Conflicts of Interest and Self-Dealing

for
Family
Foundation
Boards,
NAT'L
CTR.
FAM.
PHILANTHROPY,
https://www.ncfp.org/export/sites/ncfp/knowledge/passages/2013/downloads/Avoiding-Conflictsand-Self-Dealing-for-Family-Foundation-Boards-NCFP-2013.pdf.
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2. Acts of Self-Dealing

'

Even if a transaction between a private foundation and a disqualified
person exists, that transaction must fall within the definition of an act of selfdealing (with no applicable exception) for the Code Section 4941 excise tax to
apply. The definition of an act of self-dealing is quite broad and covers most
transactions one could contemplate. The definition includes "any direct or
indirect"16 transaction involving any of the following: the sale, exchange, or
leasing of property;'6 7 the lending of money or other extension of credit;' 8 the
furnishing of goods, services or facilities by a private foundation;1 69 the payment
of compensation or reimbursement of expenses;17 0 and the transfer to or use by (or
for the benefit of) the income or assets of the private foundation.' 7
Congress intended these broad categories of acts of self-dealing to be
comprehensive and inclusive.' 7 2 In addition, the statutory language specifically
includes the notion that such transactions can be "direct" or "indirect," which
would prohibit a private foundation from engaging in covered transactions through
an intermediary.' 7 3 Accordingly, the term "self-dealing" encompasses a broad
range of transactions that one might not necessarily consider to be covered at first
glance. 7 4 In the investment context, the regulations state that "the purchase or sale
of stock or other securities by a private foundation" would be a prohibited use of
the foundation's assets, and therefore "an act of self-dealing if such purchase or
sale is made in "an attempt to manipulate the price of stock or other securities to
the advantage of a disqualified person.""
The definitions of an act of self-dealing do not include the concept of
fairness, benefit, or fair market value; as discussed earlier, it is intended as a
blanket prohibition on the covered acts."' As a result, an act of self-dealing can

166
167

I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1) (West 2015).
Id. § 4941(d)(1)(A).

Id. § 4941(d)(1)(B).
Id. § 4941(d)(1)(C).
170 Id. § 4941(d)(1)(D).
171 Id. § 4941(d)(1)(E). In addition, Code Section 4941(d)(1)(F) includes special rules governing
168

169

transactions between a private foundation and certain government officials.
172 1965 REPORT, supra note 125, at 15, 21 (finding that "transactions between a donor and his
foundation often provide subtle private advantages to the donor . . [and] recommending that private
foundations be prohibited from engaging in any transaction with a donor, with a list of transactions
that was illustrative only").
17 1965 REPORT, supra note 125, at 22 ("Indirect transactions . .
would also be prohibited.").
174 For example, it often comes as a surprise to a donor that his private foundation cannot purchase
tickets at a charity fundraising dinner which the donor will then use to attend. Because the donor

will receive a private benefit in the form of the dinner, it is an act of self-dealing. The price of the
ticket cannot be bifurcated, with the donor paying for the cost of the dinner, because the act of cost
sharing would be self-dealing. See Jane C. Nober, That's the Ticket, COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS

(2010), https://www.cof.org/sites/default/files/documents/files/Thats-the-Ticket.pdf
" Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(1) (as amended in 1995).
76 See discussion of the need for an absolute prohibition rather than an arm's length standard infra
Part Ill.B.(b); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-l(a) (as amended in 1973) ("For purposes of [Code
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occur even if the transaction is fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the
foundation. A board of directors of a private foundation in corporate form may, for
example, approve an interested director transaction in a manner that is fully
consistent with applicable state law provisions governing interested director
transactions, but it would still be an act of self-dealing for federal excise tax
purposes.1 77 In this manner, the self-dealing rules can be somewhat counterintuitive for private foundations and their advisors.
3. Exceptions to Acts of Self-Dealing
To alleviate the harshness caused by such a blanket prohibition, Code
Section 4941 includes a number of exceptions to the self-dealing rules."' For
example, although the statute generally prohibits the "lending of money or other
extension of credit" between a private foundation and a disqualified person, there
is an exception for loans from a disqualified person to a private foundation if the
loan carries no interest and the proceeds are used for charitable purposes."'
Similarly, although compensation of a disqualified person is, at first glance, an act
of self-dealing, Code Section 4941 (d)(2)(E) provides that a private foundation may
compensate a disqualified person for "personal services which are reasonable and
necessary to the carrying out of the exempt purposes of the private foundation" as
long as such compensation is not excessive."so
In an investment context, there are two special rules to the definition of
self-dealing that are of particular note. First, a disqualified person may furnish
goods, services or facilities to a private foundation without charge if the goods,
services and facilities are used exclusively for charitable purposes."' Additionally,
Code Section 4941 contains a special rule for transactions that involve certain"
corporate reorganizations.1 8 2 if a corporation that is a disqualified person enters
into a liquidation, merger, redemption, recapitalization or similar transaction, then

Section 4941] it is immaterial whether the transaction results in a benefit or a detriment to the private
foundation.").
177 See, for example, Section 8.31 of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987), which
generally provides that an interested director transaction is not voidable if the interested director's
interest is disclosed and the disinterested directors believe in good faith that the transaction is fair to
the corporation. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31 (Am. BAR Ass'N 1987),
http://www.muridae.com/nporegulation/documents/model npocorp act.html#8.31http://; see also
MODEL

NONPROFIT

CORP.

ACT

§

8.60

(Am.

BAR

Ass'N

2008),

www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/realpropertytrust estate/joint fall/2008/blacklett
er.authcheckdam.pdf.
178 I126 U.SI.R.C.A. § 49411 § 4941(d)(2) (West 2015).
79
1 Id. § 4941(d)(2)(B).
180 Id § 4941(d)(2)(E); the compensation exception is one of two areas where the self-dealing rules
retain a subjective standard. The other can be found in the corporate reorganization exception of
Section 4942(d)(2)(F), which requires such reorganization transactions to occur at fair market value.
See supra text accompanying notes 171-74.
181 Id. § 4941(d)(2)(C).
182 Id § 4941(d)(2)(F).
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an act of self-dealing will not occur if any stock in the corporation owned by the
disqualified person is subject to the same terms and conditions as all of the
shareholders and the foundation receives at least fair market value in the
transaction.183 This exception appears to apply specifically to corporations only, as
the statute does not mention partnerships or LLCs. Despite the statutory language
discussing only corporate transactions, the Treasury has, on occasion, looked to
Code Section 4941(d)(2)(F) for "guidance" for similar transactions for
partnerships. 184
4. Indirect Acts of Self-Dealing
As noted, the statutory definition of self-dealing specifically includes both
direct and indirect transactions.' 8 ' Neither the statutory language of Code Section
4941 nor the Treasury Regulations provides a specific definition of an "indirect"
act of self-dealing. Rather, the regulations provide some working examples of
transactions it considers to be (or not be) indirect self-dealing. For example, a loan
from a corporation controlled by a private foundation to a corporation owned by
two of the private foundation's foundation managers would be an indirect act of
self-dealing.1 86 The term self-dealing does not, however, include a transaction
between a private foundation and a disqualified person where the disqualified
person status arises only as a result of such transaction. 8 7
In addition, the Regulations provide various safe harbors for acts that
might appear to be indirect self-dealing but are not treated as such for purposes of
Code Section 4941.188 These exceptions include (1) transactions with disqualified
persons through entities that are not themselves disqualified persons;1 8 9 and (2)
transactions among disqualified persons that the private foundation could have
entered into directly. 190

1

83

Id.

184 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9237032 (June 16, 1992) ("We believe that in some situations these stated

provisions [Code Section 4941(d)(2)(F) and its regulations] provide guidance in the disposition of a
private foundation's interests in a partnership which is a disqualified person."); see also I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 200429013 (Apr. 23, 2004) (involving an LLC taxed as a partnership).
185 I.R.C. § 494126 U.S.C. § 4941(d)(1) (2015); Treas.20165); Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-1(a) (as
amended in 1973).
186 Id. at (d)-l (b)(8) (example 1).
i.Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-l(a) (the regulations cite as an example a bargain sale in which the seller
becomes a substantial contributor and therefore, a disqualified person).
188 In addition to the Regulatory exceptions to the definition of an act of indirect self-dealing
discussed above, there are exceptions for (1) transactions arising out of pre-existing relationships
(Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-l(b)); (2) grants to intermediary organizations involving certain public
officials (Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)(--)-I(B)(2)); (3) transactions during the administration of an
estate or revocable trust (Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)(-)-)-l(B)(3)); and (4) retail transactions involving
amounts under $5,000 (Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-1(b)(6)).
189 Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-l(b)(4).
190 Id. at § 53.4941(d)-I(b)(6).
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Under the first exception, a private foundation will not be engaged in an
act of self-dealing merely by having an ownership interest in an entity where other
disqualified persons also have an ownership interest.i'' This exception is not
unlimited, however, in that the entity cannot be controlled by the private
foundation, nor can it be a 35% Controlled Entity. 19 2 For these purposes, a private
foundation would control an entity if the foundation or one or more of its
foundation managers (acting as such) could require the organization to engage in
a transaction that would constitute self-dealing. Accordingly, this exception would
allow a private foundation and its disqualified persons to be limited partners in
many independent investment entities, such as a third party-managed hedge fund.
This exception may be premised on the assumption that since neither the private
foundation nor the disqualified persons control the entity, the entity will not
operate for the benefit or detriment of either party.193
Under the second applicable exemption, a transaction between
disqualified persons is not an act of self-dealing with respect to a private
foundation if the private foundation could have engaged in the transaction directly..
By way of example, the regulations indicate that an organization controlled by a
private foundation could pay compensation to a disqualified person. Even though
the private foundation is not a direct participant in the transaction, no act of indirect
self-dealing would occur if the controlled organization qualified for the exception
for reasonable compensation for personal services. 19 4
Under these two exemptions, it is usually possible for a private foundation
to enter into a commercial hedge fund or other investment created and controlled
by a third party, even if other disqualified persons are participants in the fund.
D. Investing Along with Disqualified Persons
Under Code Section 4941: The PLRs
With the increases in alternative investing and the growing sophistication
of the family office, it is not surprising to see private foundations that wish to
participate in investment vehicles in which their disqualified persons are
participants-whether as co-investors, managers, or both. The investment vehicle
itself often becomes a disqualified person due to the application of the 35%
Controlled Entity rule. As a result of increased activity in this area, the IRS issued

191

Id. at § 53-4941(d)-l(b)(4).

192 Id.
i9 I.R.C. 4946(a)(1)(F) (West 2015). This assumption, however, is based on the power of the
foundation and the disqualified persons to control the governance of the entity. This causes a
disconnect when analyzing partnerships, however, as a disqualified person's status with respect to a
partnership is judged not on voting control, but on the individual's profits interest in the partnership.
Thus, a disqualified person may be the general partner of a limited partnership but only a 1% profits
interest; the limited partnership would not be a disqualified person. Conversely, a disqualified person
could hold 50% of the limited partnership interests and none of the general partnership interest (and
therefore none of the control), and the partnership would still be a disqualified person.
194 Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-1(b)(7).
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a series of private letter rulings in the early 2000s that provided a road map on how
a private foundation could invest in a partnership alongside disqualified persons
without triggering the Code Section 4941 excise tax.1 95
1. The 2001 PLR
In the first of the Private Letter Rulings in 2001, the IRS considered the
transfer of limited partnership interests by an LLC to a private foundation.' 96 A
husband and wife (H and W), both of whom were trustees of the private foundation,
funded, owned and controlled the LLC.' 97 The LLC was, in essence, acting as a
holding company for H and W.
The limited partnership invested in publicly traded companies and short
positions to hedge its long positions in these companies. 198 The general partner of
the limited partnership was an entity that was effectively controlled by H.1 99 In
addition, the limited partnership was managed by an entity that was also controlled
by H. 2 00 Although the manager would otherwise have been entitled to
compensation, -the manager and the general partner waived its fee and profit
allocation with respect to the private foundation. 20 1
As both H and W were trustees of the private foundation, they were
disqualified persons with respect to the private foundation because they were
foundation managers.202 H and W owned all of the outstanding interests in the
LLC; therefore, the LLC itself is a disqualified person with respect to the private
foundation because it was a 35% Controlled Entity. 2 03 The PLR states that the
limited partnership itself was a disqualified person, as were the general partner
entities and the manager entities. 204 As a result, the private foundation invested in,
essentially, a hedge fund in limited partnership form that itself was a disqualified
person, with disqualified persons as co-partners.

1 See generally DAVID H. KIRK, SELF-DEALING AND THE LOBSTER POT OF JOINT VENTURES (2005).
96 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200148069 (Dec. 3, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 PLR]. It is unclear from the
2001 PLR whether the private foundation was admitted as a limited partner or merely continued on
as an assignee of the transferred limited partnership interest.
1' Id. at 1. The LLC was taxed as a partnership for federal income tax purposes.

'9 As such, it appears that the limited partnership itself was essentially a hedge fund run by H. Id. at

2; see the definition of a hedge fund infra note 204.
199 Technically, the general partner of the limited partnership was another partnership; the general
partner of the second partnership was an entity that was wholly owned by H. Id at 2.
200 Again, technically, the limited partnership was managed by another partnership, the general

partner of which was an entity that was owned by H. Id. at 2.
201 The limited partner normally would have received a management fee based on a percentage of

assets of invested in the limited partner; the general partner received a profit allocation from the
limited partner. Id. at 2.

I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(B) (West 2015).
I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(C)(ii); see also 2001 PLR, supra note 196.
204 The PLR does not analyze these separate entities in specific detail, but simply states that they are
disqualified persons due to ownership and/or control. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200148069 (Dec. 3, 2001)
202
203
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When the LLC transfers its interest in the limited partnership by gift to the
private foundation, there could have been an act of self-dealing if the LLC had
been relieved of debt as a consequence of the transfer. It appears that neither the
LLC nor H or W were subject to any such liabilities; therefore, no act of selfdealing occurred on the gift.20 5 Moreover, while reasonable compensation for
personal services might have qualified as an exception to the definition of an act
of self-dealing, compensation was specifically waived in this case. As providing
services without charge is not an act of self-dealing, the investment was held to not
violate the provisions of Code Section 494 1.206
In the 2001 PLR, the private foundation did not invest directly in the hedge
fund; rather, the LLC purchased the hedge fund interest and then gratuitously
transferred the interest to the private foundation. Therefore, at no point did the
private foundation exchange assets with the hedge fund in return for its interest.
The 2001 PLR does not state whether the private foundation thereafter became a
true limited partner in the hedge fund, or whether it was a mere assignee of the
interest. If it actually became a substituted partner, query whether it was thereby
relieving the limited partner of its legal obligations (which may be minimal under
the partnership agreement if there was limited liability and no obligation to make
additional capital transfers) as a consequence of the transfer. In addition, we do not
know if there were any benefits to disqualified persons by virtue of having the
private foundation's funds held in the hedge fund itself. Clearly, it seems that it
would be beneficial to the fund's overall balance sheet to have more assets under
management.207 In any event, by allowing H to retain control over the investment
of the funds through his various management entities, the IRS allows the exact
conflict of interest predicted in the Patman report and the 1965 Report.208
2. The 2003 PLR
Following the 2001 PLR, the IRS again considered the issue of the
investment by a private foundation in a limited partnership in 2003. It is this PLR
that first introduced the language indicating that the private foundation and
disqualified person were participating in a "co-investment."
In the 2003 PLR, a group of four investment advisors (known as A, B, C,
and D) created an investment partnership in limited partnership form; the limited
partners of this investment partnership were unrelated to the advisors or the private
foundation at issue. 209 The general partner of the investment partnership was a

205 The partnership interests were subject to short positions, but short positions do not count as

indebtedness for these purposes. Id.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(d)(3) (as amended in 1995).
207
See generally Houman B. Shdab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: FinancialInnovation
and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 240 (2009).
208 See discussionsupra Section II.B.
209 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200318069 (Feb. 3, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 PLR]. The investment
partnership invested in publicly traded securities, including derivatives and short positions. Id at 3.
206
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second management limited partnership, of which the four investment advisors and
various individuals and entities related to the investment advisors, directly and
indirectly, were partners.210 A created and was the sole trustee of a private
foundation. B, C, and D were not disqualified persons with respect to A's private
foundation.
Through a complex entity structure, the four investment advisors were
indirectly compensated for managing the investments of the investment
partnership. The managers were compensated in two ways: through a quarterly
management fee211 and through a special allocation of profits earned by the
investment fund.212 As the general partner was ultimately owned by the four
investment advisors, part of the management fee after payment of the costs of the
general partner would have been payable to A. Additionally, the investment
managers indirectly received a special profits allocation from the hedge fund. 213
The intention, however, was not for the private foundation to invest
directly in the investment partnership, but in the general partner of the investment
partnership. The PLR states that a direct investment in the hedge fund would not
be permissible due to "security law concerns."214 Interestingly, the PLR
characterizes the private foundation was wanting to "avail itself of the services" of
the investment managers, but as the investment managers only provided services
to the hedge fund, the only way to obtain those services would be to participate in
the hedge fund, directly or indirectly.215
Rather, the private foundation intended to invest in the general partner in
the investment partnership. The general partner of the investment partnership
would invest the private foundation's contributions in the hedge fund as its own
capital contribution. Since the management fee is based upon the assets of the
limited partners under management of the hedge fund, there would be no
management fee payable to the general partner with respect to its own investment.

From the description, the investment partnership appears to have been a hedge fund, as with the
investment partnership at issue in the 2001 PLR.
210 The second limited partnership (the one acting as the general partner of the investment partnership
was owned by (1) A; (2) a corporation owned by A and his immediate family; (3) B, C, and D and
various entities related to them; and (4) W, an investment entity controlled by A, B, C, and D. Id. at
1-2. W was a wholly owned subsidiary of a business trust that had elected into S corporation status
for federal income tax purposes, all of the beneficial interests of which were owned by A, B, C, and
D. Id
211 The management fee was a set percentage of the all of the limited partner's assets under
management valued quarterly, payable to the general partner. Id. at 3-4.
212 Id. at 3. If the private foundation were to become a limited partner in the hedge fund, that part of
the management fee attributable to its invested assets would indirectly constitute compensation to A
for services rendered.
213

Id

Id. at 36. The PLR does not indicate what securities law concerns were at issue; it is possible, for
example, that the private foundation did not have $5.0 million in assets and therefore was not
automatically an accredited investor. See discussion of accredited investors supra pp. 20-22.
215 Id. Of course, an investment manager could provide personal service and received reasonable
compensation and fall within an exception to the self-dealing rules. Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(2)
(as amended in 198419841 (b)(iii)(b)(7).
214
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Similarly, since the special profits allocation occurred on the hedge fund level, the
private foundation's investment through the general partner would not be subject
to the special allocation. The actual receipts passing to the private foundation
would be governed by the partnership agreement of the entity acting as the general
partner, not the investment partnership itself.
The partnership agreement of the general partner specifically prohibited
the partnerships from engaging in any transaction that would be a direct or indirect
act of self-dealing.216 In addition, the taxpayer represented, and the IRS accepted,
that the private foundation's investment "in [the hedge fund] will not create any
economies of scale or any other benefit for the [general partner], [the hedge fund],
or any other investor . . . In particular, [the private foundation's] proposed
investment will not benefit the Investment Advisors personally in any way. "217
The management limited partnership (the general partner of the investment
partnership) is a disqualified person with respect to A's foundation because more
than 35% of the partnership is owned by A and parties related to A.218 Therefore,
any transaction between the management limited partnership and the private
foundation would be an act of self-dealing, unless an exception applied. In this
case, if a transaction existed, there does not appear to be any applicable exception.
Therefore, it was necessary to look at the potential transactions that could
have occurred between the general partner of the investment fund and the private
foundation. The first, and most obvious, is the actual acquisition of the interest in
general partner by the private foundation. Unlike the 2001 PLR, where the private
foundation received its interest in the limited partnership by gift, the 2003 PLR
involves a contribution of funds by the foundation to the partnership in return for
a partnership interest. At first glance, the contribution of capital in return for an
interest appears to be a sale or exchange of assets that would be an act of selfdealing. However, the 2003 PLR states as follows:
[the private foundation's] proposed acquisition of a limited partnership
interest in [the general partner] is in substance a "co-investment
arrangement" by [the private foundation] in [the general partner] along
with other partners of [the general partner], not a sale or exchange
between [the private foundation] and [the general partner or any of the
partners of the general partner]. This arrangement is more properly
characterized as involving services in the nature of "brokerage and
portfolio services" performed for [the private foundation] by [the general
partner]. 219
The internal quotes surrounding "co-investment arrangement" are in the
text of 2003 PLR, but there are no citations attributed to the quote, nor does the

216 2003 PLR, supra note 209, at 47.
2 17
Id. at 4.
218
2 19

id. at8.
1d at 15-16.
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2003 PLR cite any authority for re-characterizing the transaction as in the nature
of brokerage and portfolio services. In justifying this re-characterization, the IRS
goes on to state as follows:
The purpose of [the private foundation's] acquisition of a partnership
interest in [the general partner] is to permit [the private foundation] to
make an investment in [the investment partnership] that it could not
otherwise make, and to allow it to make such an investment on a more
favorable basis than it could if it could invest in [the investment
partnership] directly. This arrangement will also give [the private
foundation] essentially the same rights as a direct investment in [the
investment partnership]. No disqualified person will benefit from [the
private foundation's] investment, by reducing their administrative
expenses or in any other way. 220
The IRS goes onto re-characterize the transaction not as an investment in the
221
general partner, but in the underlying hedge fund itself.
Thus, the IRS justified the re-characterization of the transaction as a coinvestment on the basis that it was in the best interests of the foundation-which
is, by Congressional design, not ajustification for an act of self-dealing described
in Code Section 4941.222 It is worth questioning, of course, whether the private
foundation should be investing in a fund that it would otherwise be prohibited in
investing due to the securities law, and whether it should have substantially all of
its assets invested with a single fund, even that fund is itself diversified. 2 23 Finally,
the IRS seems to take at face value the representation that there is no benefit to the
manager of the investment fund to have additional assets available for investment
in the fund itself, whether from a securities law point of view or simply by virtue
of having additional available liquidity or assets under management. In fact, one
of the acts of self-dealing repeatedly cited in both the Patman report and the 1965
Report was having a ready source of liquid capital available in the form of
foundation assets, were then invested in a manner that would benefit the
disqualified persons. 22 4

220

Id. at 16.

Id. at 16-17. (citing the diversification within the investment fund itself as sufficient
diversification to avoid the jeopardizing investment excise tax of Code Section 4944).
222 See discussion infra Section II.BBI.
223 Investing with a single fund manager was one of the reasons why a number of private foundations
lost everything in the Bernard Madoff scandal. See Sharon Schneider, Private Foundations: Five
Steps to Keep the Next Bernie Madoff Away from Your Assets, RIABIz (Oct. 23, 2009),
http://www.riabiz.com/a/60019/private-foundations-five-steps-to-keep-the-next-bemie-madoffaway-from-your-assets. There was some discussion that the IRS would pursue these private
foundations for making jeopardizing investments under Code Section 4944. Michele A. W.
McKinnon,
Madoff's
Unintended
Legacy
to
Charities,
McGUIREWOODS,
https://www.mcguirewoods.com/newsresources/publications/taxation/madoffs%2unintended%201
egacy.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).
224 Patman Report, supra note 128, at 16; 1965 REPORT, supra note 125, at 16 ("[The knowledge
221

2017]

THE HOBGOBLIN OFLITLE MTNDS

429

3. The 2004 PLR
PLR 200420029225 expanded the co-investment concept first introduced in
the 2003 PLR, applying it to what appears to be a true family office scenario. The
family 22 6 intended to set up a partnership for purposes of coordinating the family's
investments.227 The primary investors would be members of the family and related
entities, although the 2004 PLR indicates that it would be possible that unrelated
individuals would be invited to invest in a particular fund.22 8 As a result, the 2004
PLR assumed that the investment partnership would at all times be a 35%
Controlled Entity, and therefore a disqualified person with respect to the
foundation. Accordingly, any transaction between the private foundation and the
investment partnership would presumptively be an act of self-dealing, if not
otherwise subject to an exception.
The family's private foundation intended to invest in one or more of these
family investment partnerships in varying allocations. The PLR indicates that the
rationale for the family to invest through these partnerships was "increased,
negotiating power and cost savings which the partners would not have if they
invested separately, as well as access to certain brokerage, tax, and portfolio
services."22 Unlike the 2003 PLR, there is a clear benefit to the family from
investing in these family partnerships. The private foundation specifically
represented that in wanted to invest in the family partnerships because it would
(1) [P]ermit [the foundation] to obtain certain brokerage, tax, and
portfolio services provided by [the investment fund] or the Additional
Partnerships; (2) assist [the private foundation] in diversifying its
portfolio; (3) obtain access through [the investment fund] or the
Additional Partnerships to investments with higher minimum investment
requirements than [the foundation] would want to satisfy using its assets

that his foundation can be used as a source of capital - even at the prevailing interest rates - can
influence the decision of the donor in his capacity as an official of the foundation as to the asset
which the foundation should hold in its portfolio. A donor who thinks that he may want to call upon
his foundation for funds at some future date may have the foundation keep its funds in a form readily
convertible to cash . . .").
225 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200420029 (Feb. 19, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 PLR]; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200042047 (Jun. 15, 2011) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200423029 (March 11, 2004) (accepting without
question the representation that an investment by a charitable remainder trust in an LLC was not a
sale or exchange for state (Ohio) law purposes.)
226 The PLR indicates that participants in the investment partnership would include descendants and
spouses of a particular company's founder, as well as trusts, LLCs and other partnerships in which
the family would have more than a 50 percent voting or profits interest. Id. at 1.
227 Ultimately, the family intended to set up multiple partnerships, each of which would have a
different investment style. A particular family investor could then participate in the various
partnerships in proportion to its desired portfolio investment allocation to the partnership's particular
investment style. Thus, the investment partnerships at issue would essentially act as private funds for
the family. Id. at 2.
228 Id. at 223.
229 Id.
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alone, and (4) permit [the foundation] to effect economies of scale and
resulting cost savings as well as greater negotiating power.230
The PLR specifically states that the foundation did not know exactly how much of
its assets would be invested in each investment partnership; however, it did state
that the private foundation's investments "will constitute a substantial percentage,
perhaps even exceeding fifty percent, of the total assets of each partnership in
question." 231
The provisions of the partnership agreement specifically prohibit the
partnership from engaging in acts of self-dealing. To the extent that the private
foundation's assets, when combined with all of the other assets of the partnership,
would entitle the partnership as a whole to a discounted fee, those cost savings
would accrue to the partnership. 23 2 Given that the private foundation's investments
in each investment partnership would constitute such a significant portion of
investment portfolio, the partnerships should have access to investments that
would not otherwise be available. Thus, even if the other family members
disclaimed the fee, there may be benefits to the family in terms of access to
investments and, as with the fund in the 2003 PLR, access to ready liquidity to
meet investment minimums.
In order to protect against potential acts of self-dealing, the investment
partnership agreement gives the foundation certain protections, including a veto
right over certain defined decisions. In addition, the foundation had a right to
receive an in kind distribution of each of the partnership's assets if it chose to
withdraw. 233
As with the 2003 PLR, it appears that the private foundation was making
the case that the investment was fair and reasonable to the foundation and in its
best interests, which is not a rationale to excuse an act of self-dealing. These
representations could have been made to negate an intent to provide a benefit to
disqualified persons, although under a traditional Code Section 4941 analysis,
intent is irrelevant. It is the existence of the transaction-a sale or exchange or the
use of foundation assets-that triggers the excise tax. The partnership does not
make the same representation made by the investors in the 2003 PLR that no

230 Id. at 4-5.
231 Id. at 3. If the foundation's investment in the partnership is significant enough in absolute
dollars,

the foundation's investment could be sufficient to make the partnership an accredited investor, to the
extent such classification would be relevant for that fund's particular style. The 2004 PLR indicates
that the private foundation was formed in 1943 and has investment assets in excess of "$650,000x."

Id. at 1. See the discussion of accredited investor status infra Part II.D.
By way of example, many financial institutions charge a percentage fee that is based on a sliding
scale of assets under management, with the fee reduced as the amount of assets under management
232

increase. The assets added to the partnership by the private foundation would likely qualify it for
lower overall fees as a percentage. See Manisha Kathuria & Heather Meyers, Investment Outsourcing
Fee Basics, RUSSELL INV. (Feb. 2014), http://non-profits.russell.com/documents/institutionalinvestors/research/investment-outsourcing-fee basics.pdf.
233

2004 PLR, supra note 225, at 3.
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personal benefit would accrue to the family investors in the partnership; rather, it
indicates that special provisions are included in the operating agreement to prevent
any benefits from accruing to family members.234
Echoing the language of the 2003 PLR, the IRS states that the private
foundation's proposed acquisition of an interest in the investment partnership
would be
in substance a "co-investment arrangement" by [the foundation] in [the
investment fund] or an Additional Partnership along with the other
investors in these entities; it is not a sale or exchange between [the
foundation] and the other partners of [the investment fund] .. . In joint
or co-investment situations, where a private foundation acquires an
additional interest in the partnership entity after its formation and initial
funding or withdraws its interest, there is neither an economic benefit to
the other investors nor does the ownership or holdings of the other
investors change in any economic or other material respect.23 5
As with the 2003 PLR, the 2004 PLR does not attribute the term "co-investment.
arrangement" to any particular source even though it is in quotes, nor does it cite
to any support for its ability to re-characterize the transaction as "in substance" a
co-investment arrangement.
As with the 2003 PLR, the 2004 PLR does not appear to take into account
the benefit of having access to particular investments, of retaining control of family
funds, or of the significant liquidity available to the family to make investments.
Moreover, it does not take into account the potential benefits under the securities
laws at the time to the family, which might influence the manner in which the.,
private foundations invested. Finally, the mere fact that the private foundation
needed to negotiate terms to attempt to prevent acts of self-dealing indicates that a
transaction has, in fact, occurred and that the private foundation's assets are being
used by the partnership and the other partners, presumably to their benefit. This
does not necessarily mean that the assets are being used to the detriment of the
private foundation, but that is not the touchstone of the self-dealing excise tax.
4. The 2005 PLR
The IRS issued the final letter ruling in the series in 2005.236 As with the
2004 PLR, the founder of a private foundation and the founder's family and other
related entities intended to create an investment fund in which the private
foundation would invest-in this case, however, the fund appears to be an LLC for
state law purposes. 237 As with the 2004 PLR, the investment fund benefitted the

234 Id.

Id. at 6.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200551025 (Sept. 28, 2005) [hereinafter the 2005 PLR].
237 Id. at 1.
235

236
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entire family group by reducing administrative costs, providing access to
investments that might otherwise be unavailable to individual members,
facilitating diversification, and increasing negotiating power.23 8 Unlike the 2004
PLR, the 2005 PLR involves a single fund invested in a number of different
independently managed investment funds.239
Each investor in the investment fund could withdraw all or part of their
investment quarterly upon appropriate notice to the partnership, assuming that the
withdrawal exceeded $10,000. If the withdrawal request was in excess of $2.0
million, the LLC has the option to pay in cash, portfolio securities, or a
combination thereof. If the withdrawal is of the member's entire investment, then
the LLC retained some additional flexibility in the timing of the withdrawal
payment. 240 Accordingly, the LLC has the power to delay a distribution or pay out
a distribution in a manner that benefits the LLC in its discretion, despite the fact
that it represented that the partnership would not "purchase or sell investments in
an attempt to manipulate the price of investments to the advantage of a disqualified
person."2 4 1 Indeed, this is the first mention in any of the PLRs of the Treasury
Regulation that indicates that manipulation of foundation investments for the
benefit of a disqualified person is a prohibited use of foundation assets. 242
As with the 2001 and 2003 PLRs, the manager of the LLC waived all fees
with regard to the private foundation. 24 3 As with the 2004 PLR, the private
foundation would be responsible for any third party costs and fees, but to the extent
that the fee is based on a sliding scale, the foundation would pay the lowest
percentage and the other member would pay the remaining fees.244
The family specifically represented that the investment fund would not
engage in any self-dealing transactions (such as a lease to a disqualified person.)
However, unlike the 2003 PLR, the family never makes the statement that the
family would not receive any benefit from the foundation's participation in the
fund. The family only represents that the LLC would not engage in specific types
of self-dealing transactions with reference to the statutory provisions of Code
Section 4941.245
In its analysis, the IRS uses the "in substance a 'co-investment
arrangement"' language found in the 2003 and 2004 PLRs. As a result, the 2005
PLR states that there is no sale or exchange between the private foundation and the
partnership or any of the other members. The IRS also employed the identical
language from the 2004 PLR that states that there is no economic benefit to the

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1-2.
240 If the withdrawal was the entire interest, 90% would be paid out at the regular quarterly
date, with
a delay of approximately one month in order to determine value.
241 2005 PLR, supra note 236, at 5.
242 Id See the discussion of Treasury regulation § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(1) supra Part III.
243 Id. at 2.
244 Id. at 3.
245 Id
238

239
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other partners or the partnership upon formation, initial funding, or withdrawal.246
As with the prior rulings, the 2005 PLR never discusses issues of access, liquidity,
control, or volume, even though the private foundation states that it will invest
approximately 56% of its assets in the investment fund.247
5. Investing After the 2005 PLR
As a result of these private letter rulings, any private foundation that
wanted to participate in a collective investment fund or holding company that
would be a disqualified person on its own accord had a clear road map. All of the
PLRs spend an extraordinary amount of time analyzing compensation structuresusually involving a waiver. Such a concern seems misplaced, however, as
reasonable compensation for personal services is one of the few transactions that
are explicitly excepted from the definition of an act of self-dealing, although a
waiver of compensation may have prevented the foundation from being a "client"
for purposes of the Investment Advisors Act.248 Alternatively, the investment funds
may have waived such fees because they would not qualify as personal services or
the private foundation did not want to go through (or could not support) a
2 49
reasonable compensation analysis.
Overall, the PLRs take an extraordinarily narrow view of the concept of
benefit that can be taken from collective investment, a view that is inconsistent
with the legislative history of Code Section 4941.250 While the PLRs paid specific
attention to the issue of the transfer of capital transfer, the IRS specifically avoided
characterizing the investment by the foundation in the investment fund as a
transaction. The IRS ignored the exchange of interests in the fund for capital even
though it is clear from the PLRs that significant attention and negotiation went into
the terms of the investment fund agreements and the use of the private foundation's
capital. 25 1 In addition, as discussed in the next section, the IRS ignored the
treatment of that exchange as a matter of both property law and federal tax law.
Finally, the PLRs specifically ignored the benefits that could accrue to the family
from controlling the private foundation's investments through the investment fund.
These include cost savings from securities law compliance, access to investments
with minimum investment requirements, cost sharing through the family office,
having access to a pool of liquid funds available for investment, and otherwise not

246
247

Id. at 5.
Id. at 2.

248 See supra Part II.D.
24 9
The compensation exception is discussed supra Part 11.C.2.
250 1965 REPORT, supra note 125, at 23 ("The imposition of a general prohibition of self-dealing
properly limits the deduction for charitable donations to only those situations in which the donor has
completely parted with the donated property and thus has committed it without reservation to
charitable purposes.").
21 For example, the private foundation apparently negotiated, as a condition of the contribution of
capital, the very provisions of the investment fund agreements that, ironically, were specifically

designed to avoid self-dealing. See 2004 PLR, supra note 225, at 3; 2005 PLR, supra note 236, at 3.
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ceding control over a significant pool of assets under management to a third party.
As a result of this retained control, the investment decisions of the private
foundation could have been improperly informed by the needs of and benefits to
disqualified persons.
IV. INVESTING IN PARTNERSHIPS: TAX AND PROPERTY LAW
APPROACHES
Central to the treatment of partnerships as co-investments in the letter
rulings is the concept that there is no transaction between the private foundation
and a disqualified person. The IRS's position in the PLRs is that the private
foundation, as a partner in the partnership, does not interact with the partnership
itself, or with the other partners. Rather, the private foundation's interest in the
partnership is a silo, with the other partners merely investing side-by-side, with
each partner maintaining a separate interest in partnership property. The notion
that there is no transaction with the partnership or among the partners is contrary
to the modem view of the partnership as an entity in and of itself, as opposed to an
aggregation of its partners. Similarly, the idea of co-investment contradicts the
treatment of partnerships under other parts of the Internal Revenue Code itself.
A. State Law Treatment of Partnerships
The characterization of partnership property and the relationship among
partners in the United States has a long history, going back as far as America's
English common law roots.2 52 Most modem statutory provisions governing U.S.
partnerships, however, derive from the efforts of the Uniform Law Commission to
promulgate uniform laws governing both general partnership and limited
partnerships.
1. General Partnerships
In 1914, the Uniform Law Commission adopted the first uniform law on
general partnerships, the Uniform Partnership Act (herein "UPA 1914").253 Central
to the discussions surrounding UPA 1914 was the conceptual framework of a
partnership: is it an entity, or merely an aggregation of its partners? 254 At the time,

252 For a summary of the history of partnership law in the context of the tax laws, see Bradley T.
Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of PartnershipTaxation, 43 GA. L. REV. 717 (2009) and DOUGLAS
M. BRASON, JOAN M. HEMINWAY, MARK J. LOWENSTEIN, MARK I. STEINBERG, MANNING G. WARREN,
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 1-3
253 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1914) [hereinafter UPA 1914].

(2d ed. 2012).

The Commissioners' Prefatory Note to UPA 1914 indicates that work on the uniform law started
as early as 1902. In 1910, the commission was considering two competing drafts: "a draft of a
partnership act on the so-called entity idea... [and] ... a draft of a proposed uniform act, embodying
the theory that a partnership is an aggregate of individuals associated in business, which is that at
254
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the common law favored the aggregate theory. After much debate, however, the
resulting UPA 1914 embodied an amalgam of both approaches.255 The definition
of' 56 a partnership under UPA 1914 was "a partnership is an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 2 57 This recognizes
the existence of individual partners, but clearly identifies the partnership as an
association separate from its co-owners.
Under Section 24 of UPA 1914, a partner had three property rights: "his
rights in specific partnership property," "his interest in the partnership," and "his
right to participate in management." 25 8 With a nod to the aggregate theory of
partnerships, UPA 1914 did maintain a concept of a "tenancy by partnership."
Under this approach, each partner was treated as co-owner of each partnership
asset as "a tenant in partnership." 25 9 Tenancy in partnership gave each partner an
equal right to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes,
subject to the provisions of the statute and any agreement among the partners.260
UPA 1914 placed a significant limitation on a partner's right to use the property,
in that it could only be used for partnership purposes. Thus, unlike a true tenancy
in-common, a partner's interest in partnership property was significantly more
limited in scope. At the same time, UPIA 1914 defined the partner's interest in the
partnership as merely the partner's "share of the profits and surplus."2 6
In commenting on the new UPA 1914, Prof. Williston indicated that the
primary benefits of the use of the entity theory were obtained despite the fact that
the original UPA mostly followed the common law, aggregate theory roots of
partnership. The joint ownership of partnership property under common law
provided administratively difficult and the settlement of claims of creditor became
problematic when the identity of the partners changed.262 The creation of the
tenancy by partnership was designed to avoid the administrative difficulties caused,
by true co-ownership by partners, while still recognizing the existing common law.

present accepted in nearly all the states of the Union." Id. at prefatory note; see also Samuel Williston,
Unform PartnershipAct with Some Remarks on Other Uniform CommercialLaws, 63 U. PA. L. REV.
196,207 (1914) ("Very many of the troublesome questions involved in that branch of the law depend
for their answer on whether what is called the entity theory of partnership, or the so-called aggregate

theory be adopted.").
255 The most serious objection to adopting full entity theory, and one of the last vestiges of aggregate

theory remaining today, is the joint and several liability of partners in an individual capacity. At the
time of the original UPA, there was a concern that use of full entity theory would force creditors to
proceed only against the partnership. Williston, supra note 254, at 211.
256

Id. at 209.

§ 6. This definition carried forward into RUPA at Section 101(b),
discussed infra note 265. REVISED UNIF. P'sIP ACT § 101(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1994) [hereinafter
RUPA].
257 UPA 1914, supra note 253,

Id.
Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
258

259

262

§ 24.
§ 25(1).
§ 25(2)(a).
§ 26.

Williston, supra note 254, at 211.
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If UPA 1914 had espoused a pure aggregate theory of partnership, one
could argue that the IRS' view of partners as co-investors is at least initially
plausible. The aggregate theory of partnership could support the view the private
foundation was simply an investor in the hedge fund, along with its fellow partners
in the family entity-that is, they were co-investing. This theory is flawed,
however, because UPA 1914 did not adopt a pure aggregate theory; it was an
amalgam of both theories. UPA 1914 clearly recognizes the partnership as an
entity. Although a private foundation might have a tenancy in partnership in each
asset held by the partnership, the private foundation was not free to deal with its
interest in those assets as it pleased. Its use of its interests in the partnership's assets
was limited by its obligation to use the for partnership purposes. In fact, UPA 1914
specifically states that joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common and tenancy-by-theentireties do not establish a partnership.263 Even under UPA 1914, the partnership
could not be seen as merely a conduit through which the private foundation held a
proportionate share of the underlying partnership assets with co-investors.
The story of UPA, however, does not begin and end in 1914. In 1986, the
American Bar Association recommended a number of revisions to the UPA 1914,
specifically stating that "entity theory 'should be incorporated into any revision of
the UPA wherever possible."' 2 64 After a string of revisions throughout the
1990s, 2 65 the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (herein "RUIPA") was the end
result, even though the Act is not officially titled as such.
RUPA explicitly codifies the entity theory of partnerships: "A partnership
is an entity distinct from its partners."2 66 The Comment to this section
unambiguously states, "RUPA embraces the entity theory of the partnership. In
light of the UPA 1914's ambivalence on the nature of partnerships, the explicit
statement provided by subsection (a) is deemed appropriate as an expression of the
increased emphasis on the entity theory as the dominant model."2 67 RUPA Section

263 UPA 1914, supra note 253,

§ 7(2).
264 UNIF. P'sHIP ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1997) [hereinafter UPA 1997 or RUPA]
(citing UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnership and Unincorporated Business
Organizations, Should the Uniform PartnershipAct Be Revised?, 43 Bus. Law. 121 (1987).
265 In the early 1990s, there were a series of revisions to the UPA 1914, with a significant

recodification occurring in 1992 and subsequent amendments in 1993, 1994, 1996, and 1997. UNIF.
P'sHip ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1992); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1993); UNIF. P'SHIP

ACT (UNTF. LAW COMM'N 1994); UNIF. P'SHIp ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1996). The 1996
amendments introduced the concept of the limited liability partnership. See UPA 1997, supra note
264, prefatory note addendum. The 1997 amendments revised Section 801, which changed the rule
under UPA that a partnership technically dissolves and reforms with the withdrawal of a partner.
This led to questions as to whether it was necessary to transfer property from the "old" partnership
to the "new" partnership. Revised Section 801 does not necessarily do away with the deemed
dissolution and reformation but limits the events that cause it to occur. Thus, a limited partner's

withdrawal does not cause a dissolution, for example. This change reinforces the ascendance of the
entity theory of the partnership form. See generally Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The
Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. LAW. 1 (1993).
266

RUPA, supra note 264, § 201(a).

267 Id.

§

201 cmt.
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501 further states "a partner is not a co-owner of partnership property and has no
interest in partnership property which can be transferred, either voluntarily or
involuntarily."268 As a result, UPA 1914's concept of tenancy in partnership is
officially discarded. 269 Thus, effective with RUPA, a partner no longer has any
interest in specific partnership property.
Accordingly, when a partner contributes assets to a partnership under
RUPA, the partner ceases to have a property interest in the contributed assets.
RUPA envisions an exchange of property rights-a giving up of specific property
rights in contributed property, which are thereby extinguished, in return for a
proportionate interest in the partnership itself. Consistent with entity theory, there
is in fact a transaction with the partnership when the partner makes a capital
contribution to the partnership.270
2. State Laws Governing Limited Partnerships
UPA 1914 did not specifically cover the issues unique to limited'
partnerships, which instead were subject the Uniform Limited Partnership Act;
adopted by the Uniform Law Commission in 1916 (herein, "ULPA 1916"). While
some states had limited partnership statutes prior to ULPA 1916,271 the Uniform
Law Commission attempted not only to regularize the treatment of limited
partnership investments, but also to integrate that treatment of limited partnerships
with the UPA 1914 provisions adopted two years earlier.
In drafting ULPA 1916, the Commission intended to create a noncorporate mechanism in which an individual could contribute capital to a venture
without having to assume liability in excess of the amount contributed.272 To this
end, ULPA 1916's commentary explained, "the person who contributes capital,
though in accordance with custom called a limited partner, is not in any sense a
partner. He is, however, a member of the association. "273 Although this confusing
commentary seems to treat the limited partners as something other than a partner,
UPLA 1916 Section 1 defines a limited partnership as follows:
A limited partnership is partnership formed by two or more persons
under the provisions of Section 2, having as members one or more

268 Id.
269

§ 501.

Id. § 501 cmt.

270 Most recently, amendments were made to the 1997 version of the Act in 2011 and 2013. As part

of these revisions, the term transfer includes an assignment, a conveyance, a sale, and a transfer by
operation of law. UNIF. Bus. ORGS. CODE § 1-102(47) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N, amended 2013).
271

According to the Official Comment to ULPA 1916, the first limited partnership act was adopted

by the state of New York in 1822 with many of the "commercial states" following suit over the next
thirty years. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1916) [hereinafter ULPA 1916].
272 Id.
273 Id
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general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partners
as such shall not be bound by the obligations of the partnership.274
Unlike UPA 1914, the ULPA 1916 does not set forth the limited partner's rights
in partnership property.275
As with UPA 1914, a significant period of time passed before the Uniform
Law Commission revisited the ULPA 1916. A Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act was adopted in 1976,276 which was later updated in 1985 (herein

"RULPA 1985").277
To the extent the Commentary to Section 1 to ULPA 1916 caused any
confusion regarding the status of a limited partner as a partner, RULPA 1985
resolves the issue. RULPA 1985 states that that a limited partnership is "a
partnership formed by two or more persons under the laws of this State and having
one or more general partners and one or more limited partners,"27 8 with the term
"partner" meaning either a "limited or general partner." 279 As a true partner, the
limited partner's interest in the partnership is his or her share of the profits and
losses and the right to receive distributions of partnership assets; it does not include
an interest in partnership property.280
With the passage of ULPA 1916, and then RULPA 1985, limited
partnerships were still governed by the general partnership code as then in effect
except to the extent the provisions of ULPA/RULPA affected the rights of the
limited partners. 28 ' This changed in 2001, when the Uniform Law Commission

274

Id § 1.

Section 18 of the ULPA does state that a limited partner's interest in the partnership itself is
personal property, and Section 19 provides that the limited partner's interest is assignable. Id. § 18,
275

19. As a result, it appears that the UPA 1914's tenancy-by-partnership rules would have applied,
although it is unclear whether anything in ULPA 1916 could be read to be inconsistent with that rule.
See ULPA 1916, supra note 271, § 6(2) ("This Act shall apply to limited partnerships except in so
far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent herewith").
276 REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIp ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1976).

277 Id

§

101(6). REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'sHP ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1985) [hereinafter RULPA
1985] RULPA 1985 made some significant changes to the law of limited partnerships. It introduced

the concept of the partnership agreement into the statute; previously, the legislation only discussed
the limited partnership certificate filed with the appropriate state authorities. See id. prefatory note
(recognizing that "the limited partnership agreement, not the certificate of limited partnerships, is the
primary constitutive, organization, and governing document of a limited partnership.") As a

substantive matter, RULPA expanded the role that limited partners could play in the business of the
partnership without losing the limited partner's liability shield. Id. (revisions regarding the
permissible activities of limited partners "are among the principal innovations in the 1985 Act.").
278

Id § 101(7). A limited partner is a person who has been admitted to a limited partnership as a

limited partner in accordance with the partnership agreement.
279

Id. § Section 101(8).

280 Id. § 101(10). This definition was "intended to define what it is that is transferred when a

partnership interest is assigned." Id. § 101 cmt. RULPA 1985 Section 301 makes the crucial
distinction between a limited partner and the assignee of a limited partnership interest, who does not
become a partner until admitted into the partnership. Id. § 301.
281 See ULPA 1916, supra note 271, § 6(2) ("This Act shall apply to limited partnerships except in
so far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent herewith"); RULPA 1985, supra
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again updated the limited partnership provisions. The Uniform Limited Partnership
Act (2001),282 "de-linked" the limited partnership law from the general partnership
law, now providing that the limited partnership act was a "'stand alone' act." 2 83
Thus, prior to ULPA 2001, the nature of a general partner's interest in a
partnership was governed not by ULPA or RULPA but by the applicable version
of the UPA. Similarly, the nature of the limited partner's interest was governed
primarily by the UPA, except to the extent that is changed by ULPA or RULPAneither of which has much to say on the subject. As of ULPA 2001, the nature of
the limited partner's interest is solely governed by the new act. As first of the PLRs
was issued in 2001, the underlying fact patterns would have occurred at the time
of transition between RULPA 1985 and ULPA 2001.284
ULPA 2001 Section 104(a) states that "a limited partnership is an entity
distinct from its partners." Thus, as with the trend in the general partnership statute,
ULPA 2001 fully and explicitly adopts an entity theory of partnerships. 2 8 5 ULPA
2001 clearly takes the position that an exchange occurs on at least a contribution
of capital to a limited partnership. Section 102 defines a contribution as "any
benefit provided by a person to a limited partnership in order to become a partner
or in the person's capacity as a partner."2 86 Thus, in the case of a private foundation
that makes a contribution to a partnership in order to become a partner, as was the

note 277, § 1105 ("In any case not provide for in this act the provisions of the Uniform Partnership
Act govern.").
282 UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT (UNIR. LAW COMM'N 2001) [hereinafter ULPA 2001].
283 Id. The Commissioners noted that LLCs and LLPs now were utilized in many instances where
LPs were formerly employed; thus, ULPA 2001 focused on "sophisticated, manger-entrenched
commercials deals whose participants commit for the long term," as well as "estate planning
arrangements (family limited partnerships)." Id.
284 ULPA 2001 would have been the Uniform Law Commission's latest pronouncement at the time
of the 2001 PLR, although was not widely enacted. The current Uniform Law Commission website
indicates that only 20 states have enacted ULPA 2001 as amended in 2013. See Legislative Fact
Sheet - Limited Partnership Act (2001) (Last Amended 2013), UNIFORM L. COMM'N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Limited%/2OPartnership%2Act/20(
2001)%20(Last%20Amended%202013) (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). Thus, ULPA 2001 would have
been the most modem statement of limited partnership law, although many states may still have been
working under RULPA 1985.
285 ULPA 2001, supra note 282, § 104(a). Also following the trend established in UPA and RULPA
1985, ULPA 2001 emphasizes the partnership agreement as the governing document setting for the
relationship of the partners to one another and to the partnership. Id § 110(a). The comment to
Section 1 10(b)(13) specifically acknowledges that "the partnership is a contract. . . ." Id. § 110 cmt.
Further, a limited partner does not owe fiduciary duties to any other partner, but shall act consistently
with the contract obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Id § 305(a)-(b). Further, ULPA 2001
restricts the nature of the partner's interest in the partnership, stating that the only interest of the
partners that is transferable is the right to receive distributions. Section 701 says that "the only interest
of a partner which is transferable is the partner's transferable interest." Id. § 701. The comment to
section 701 states "like all other partnership statutes, this Act dichotomizes each partner's rights into
economic rights and other rights." Id. § 701 cmt.
286 Id § 102(2) (emphasis added); but see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-205 (2015) (Delaware RUPA
section providing that a person can be admitted as a partner and may receive a partnership interest
without making a contribution or being obligated to make a contribution).
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case in the 2003 and 2004 PLRs, a quid pro quo exchange occurs under ULPA

2001.287
B. Subehapter K of the Internal Revenue Code
Modem partnership statutes are not the only bodies of law that view the
investment in a partnership as a transaction-the Internal Revenue Code does so
as well. Subchapter K of the Code 2 88 comprehensively addresses the taxation of
partnerships-or, more appropriately, the taxation of partners in partnerships. 28 9
Subchapter K takes both an entity and an aggregate approach to partnerships,
depending upon the circumstances. 290 At least one commentator has noted that the
blending of the aggregate and entity approaches to partnership "is a primary source
of uncertainty and confusion" in the Internal Revenue Code. 2 9 1
The definition of a partnership under Code Section 761 appears to embrace
an entity theory of partnership taxation. Code Section 761 defines a partnership for
purposes of the income tax as "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other
unincorporated organization through or by means of which any business, financial
operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this
title, a corporation or a trust or estate." 2 92 The IRS can, however, exclude an
organization from the application of Subchapter K, at the election of all of the
members of the organization, if the organization is "for investment purposes only
and not for the active conduct of a business" or "for the joint . .. use of property,
but not for the purposes of selling service or the property." 293 By regulation, the
IRS can exclude an unincorporated association from the provisions of Subchapter
K as an investment partnership under Code Section 761(a)(1) if the participants:
(1) own the property as co-owners; (2) reserve the right to dispose of shares of any
property acquired or retained; and (3) do not actively conduct business or
irrevocably authorize some person or persons acting in a representative capacity to
purchase, sell, or exchange such investment property, although each separate
participant may delegate authority to purchase, sell, or exchange his share of any

287 The 2005 PLR involved an LLC, as opposed to a state law partnership, although the LLC was

treated as if were a partnership for federal tax purposes. The majority view is that an LLC operating
agreement is a contract, and as such, participation in an LLC out to be treated as if there is
consideration and mutual assent. As a result, the better. (but not universal view) is that a private
foundation transferring assets to a non-single member LLC and signing an operating agreement is
entering into a contractually enforceable transaction. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Ties
That Bind: LLC OperatingAgreements as Binding Commitments, 68 SMU L. REv. 811 (2015).
288
289

I.R.C. §§ 701-777 (West 2015).

Id. § 701.
290 Compare Borden, supra note 252, at 720, with Alfred D. Youngwood & Deborah B. Weiss,
Partnersand Partnerships- Aggregate v. Entity Outside ofSubchapter K, 48 TAx LAW. 39 (1994)

(favoring a presumption of aggregate theory in approaching partnership tax issues outside of the
provisions of Subchapter K).
291 Youngwood & Weiss, supra note 290, at 39.
292
293

I.R.C. § 761(a).
Id § 761(a)(1)-(2).
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such investment property for the time being for his account, but not for a period of
more than a year.294 The IRS has taken the position that limited partners own an
interest in the partnership and therefore, are not co-owners of the property owned
by the partnership.295 Such a position is entirely consistent with a modem entity
view of partnerships, since individual partners do not co-own the underlying
partnership assets. 2 96
While Subchapter K's definition of a partnership recognizes the
partnership as an entity, its approach to the taxation of the individual partners starts
with an aggregate theory of partnerships. Code Section 701 provides that "a
partnership as such shall not be subject the income tax imposed by this chapter.
Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their
separate or individual capacities."297 Upon further inspection, however, even
Subchapter K's approach to taxation does not ignore the existence of the
partnership as an entity. Rather, the partnership exists as an accounting entity 2 98
and the partner's interest in the partnership is a separate property interest, 2 99 even
if the imposition of the income tax focuses on the separate economic interests of
the individual partners.
It is difficult to conceptualize the tax treatment of transfers to a partnership
by a partner unless the partnership itself is treated as an entity and not merely as a
collection of individuals investing side-by-side. Under Code Section 1001, gain or
loss is recognized on "sale or other disposition"'oo of property, unless there is
another provision of the Code that authorizes non-recognition. 30' An exchange is
an "other disposition" of property for purposes of Code Section 1001.302
Code Section 721 specifically provides that "no gain or loss shall be
recognized to a partnership or to any of its partners in the case of a contribution of
property to the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership." Code

Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1995).
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200305025 (Oct. 29, 2002).
296
1 ULPA 2001, supra note 282, § 104(a); RUPA, supranote 264, § 501 ("a partner is not a co-owner
of partnership property and has no interest in partnership property which can be transferred, either
voluntarily or involuntarily.").
297 I.R.C. § 701.
298 The obligation to make a return of income under Section 6031 falls on the partnership itself as an
entity. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-1; I.R.C. § 6031.
299 The anti-abuse regulation of Treas. Reg. 1.701-2(a)(3) (discussed in more detail, infra, pp. 6869) specifically states that that ". . . the tax consequences under subchapter K to each partner of the
partnership operations and of transactionsbetween the partnersand the partnershipmust accurately
reflect the partners' economic agreement . . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1995)
(emphasis added). Thus, the regulations recognize that the partnership is an entity and that property
transactions can occur between the partners and the partnership.
300 I.R.C. § 1001(b).
294
295

3o'

Id.

§

1001(c).

Cottage Say. Ass'n v. C.I.R., 499 U.S. 554 (1991) ("Regulation that gain or loss arises from
exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent is a reasonable
interpretation of statute defining gain or loss from sale or other disposition of property.");
Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (1954) (calculating the basis
of the property received in a taxable exchange).
302See
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Section 721, by its terms, specifically acknowledges the possibility of exchange of
property for an interest in the partnership.3 03 Because the default rule of Code
Section 1001(c) is that gain is recognized without a specific exception elsewhere
in the tax code, it is clear that Subchapter K would treat the contribution of property
to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest as a "sale or other
disposition" for purposes of Section 1001. Thus, the default rules of Code Sections
1001 and 721(a) seem specifically to contradict the assertion in the 2003, 2004 and
2005 PLRs that no sale or exchange occurred when the private foundation
transferred assets to an investment partnership that was a disqualified person.
There is, however, a specific exception to this default non-recognition rule
for investment partnerships. Code Section 721(b) states that the non-recognition
rule for exchanges for capital contributions "shall not apply to gain realized on a
transfer of property to a partnership which would be treated as an investment
company (within the meaning of Code Section 351) if the partnership were
incorporated."3 04 The exception of Code Section 721(b) does not negate the fact
that a sale or other disposition occurred on the contribution of capital to an
investment partnership-quite to the contrary. It reinforces the fact that a sale or
other disposition (here an exchange) occurred by specifically providing that it is a
taxable event that should be recognized for tax purposes.
In case that wasn't clear enough, Code Section 761, which includes
definitions generally applicable to Subchapter K, states as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in regulations, for purposes of (1) section
708 (relating to continuation of partnerships, (2) section 743 (relating to
optional adjustments to basis of partnership property, and (3) any other
provision of this subchapter specified in regulations prescribed by the
secretary, any distribution of an interest in a partnership (not otherwise
treatedas an exchange) shall be treated as an exchange. 30

303 One might employ a theoretical construct that the exchange of property between a partner and a

partnership is really an exchange of interests among partners, where by the existing partners
relinquish an allocable portion of their interest in the partnership to the new partner. Subchapter K,
however, already has specific provisions that govern the sale of partnership interests, including the
sale of interest between partners. I.R.C. § 741; Treas. Reg. § 1.741-1(b) (as amended in 2000)
("Section 741 shall apply whether the partnership interest is sold to one or more members of the
partnership or to one or more persons who are not members of the partnership."). If the contribution
of capital to a partnership were re-characterized as the deemed sale of a partnership interest among
the partners, then Code Section 721 would be irrelevant and Code Section 741 would apply. By way
of example, if contributed property is subject to a liability that is assumed by the partnership, not as
an assumption by the other partners directly; rather the assumption is by the partnership but results
in a distribution of money to the contributing partner. Conversely, the assumption of a liability by
the other partners is treated as a contribution by them to the partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.722-1 (as
amended in 2004).
30 I.R.C. § 721(b).
305 See id. Id § 761(e) (emphasis added). Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(e) provides that certain deemed
distributions of interests in a new partnership of a partnership are not sales or exchanges of the new
interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(e) (as amended in 1997).
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Thus, the Code itself acknowledges that in most instances, 30 6 that the contribution
of capital in return for a partnership interest is an exchange, and that treatment is
clarified or negated in the case of specific provisions.
Once assets are contributed to a partnership, the baseline assumption is
that a partner does not have a specific interest in or pro rata ownership share of any
particular partnership asset, which is consistent with the approach taken by state
law. Going forward, the partner's. interest in the partnership assets is represented
by his or her partnership ownership interest, and for tax purposes, his or her
economic interest in the partnership as represented by the partner's capital account.
It is at this point in Subchapter K that the analysis that the tax treatment of the
partnership income is based upon an aggregate approach to the partnership. Some
commentators suggest that the aggregate approach should apply with respect to
partnership income and distributions, while entity theory should apply to
transactions involving partnership interest themselves.307 In either event, the
baseline structure of Subchapter K, however, does not appear to support the notion
that partners are investing "side by side" such that there was no transaction on the
entry of the partner into the partnership.
V. SHOULD THEORETICAL CONSISTENCY BE A GOAL OF THE
TAX LAW?
Even if we accept that the IRS' "co-investment" characterization is
inconsistent with state law and Subchapter K, should it matter? After all, different
legal codes have different purposes; therefore, differences in definitions and
approaches are wholly appropriate if those differences further the needs of the
codes they serve.308 As noted by one commentator, "[b]ecause partnership law
serves policy goals that differ from tax policy goals, partnership law does not guide
partnership taxation."309 Theoretical consistency, however, within a code and
between different codes with regard to similar subject matter, does have value,
even if there are times when deviation is warranted.310
306 The concept that a partner's ownership in assets contributed to the partnership ceases and is

replaced by an ownership interest in the partnership itself is reinforced by the basic rules applicable
to partnerships. The partner's outside basis in its new partnership interest is generally equal to its
basis in the assets it contributed. I.R.C. § 722. Going forward, the partnership (not the partner) has
inside basis in all of the assets contributed by all of its various partners.
307 Borden, supra note 252, at 721-22 (citing I WILLIAM S. McKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON & ROBERT
L. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶ 1.02[3] (3d ed. 1997)).
308 See id. at 723 ("The central problem of partnership law has been the development of a framework
for determining the substantive rights and obligations arising out of the partnership relationship.")
(quoting Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and Functionalism in
PartnershipLaw, 42 ARK. L. REv. 395, 396 (1989)).
30
Id. at 721.
310 This desire for theoretical consistency is different than the administrative law concept of treating
similarly situated taxpayers consistently. See Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Does the Internal
Revenue Service Have a Duty to Treat Similarly Situated Taxpayers Similarly?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
531 (2005).
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A. Consistency Within a Code
When the UPA 1914 was first enacted, the Uniform Law Commissioners
found themselves defending the law-not only the substantive law of UPA, but the
concept of codification itself. On December 19, 1914, Professor Samuel
Williston"' delivered an address to the Law Association of Philadelphia, which
was later reprinted by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review in 1915.
Professor Williston spent the first part of his address defending the effort to codify
partnership law, much of which had previously been in the form of common law
precedent,312 stating as follows:
Codification has an ugly sound to most American lawyers. We have been
trained to believe that no code can be expressed with sufficient
exactness, or can be sufficiently elastic to fulfill adequately the functions
of our common law. The iridescent legal utopia proposed by Bentham
and his followers in which everyone should readily know the law or be
able quickly to find it by turning to a code, in which the professional
lawyers would be abolished has been proved a dream.3 i3
While acknowledging the limits of a codification in a common law country,
Williston went on to make the case for codification of the partnership law. In
Williston's mind, codification would be beneficial because: (1) it produces
uniformity; (2) provides for ease of reference; (3) settles uncertain questions of
law; and (4) harmonizes "into a more consistent whole a body of doctrines, many
of which have grown up, if not at haphazard, at least without particular references
to one another."3 14
Williston's defense of the codification of the partnership law applies
equally to adopting a unified approach to partnerships within the entirety of the
Internal Revenue Code. Use of a uniform approach to partnerships will make to a
subject that is understandable and approachable. "The absence of a unifying entity
or aggregate theme in [partnership tax law] means that these situations must be
resolved on an ad hoc basis by reference to the way in which the statute applies the
entity and aggregate concepts to related or analogous situations-a process that is
difficult, tedious, and uncertain." 315 For example, it is these types of theoretical
gaps within the tax code and ad hoc determinations that allow for the rise of tax
shelters, where a taxpayer complies with the letter of the law but violates the law's

" Samuel Williston, of "Willison on Contracts" fame, was a law professor at Harvard from 1895 to
1938, and served as Dean. He was on the drafting commission for the UPA, as well as many of the
Uniform Law Commission's laws that would form the basis for the Uniform Commercial Code.
1 Williston, supra note 254.
3 Id at 196-97.
314
Id. at 199.
11 Borden, supra note 252, at 721 (citing 1 WILLIAM S. McKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON & ROBERT L.
WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS¶ 1.02[3] (3d ed. 1997)).
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underlying purpose."' Accordingly, consistency of terms and theoretical approach
ought to be a goal of any legal code, unless it simply cannot be achieved without
sacrificing a major purpose of the code itself.
This desire toward consistency is enshrined in a number of rules of
construction used by courts in reviewing statutory language. The "whole act rule"
provides that statutory terms are presumed to have consistent meaning throughout
an act or related legislation." Similarly, the statutory construction canon in pari
materia generally requires similar statutory provisions to be interpreted
similarly.318 Professors Gluck and Bressman found that "this presumption of
consistent usage . . . is widely accepted in the federal courts. Indeed, leading
commentators have called it one of the most important and consistently applied
textual default rules."3 19
Of course, there is some question as to whether judicial canons of
interpretation reflect legislative reality. The survey of legislative drafting counsel
by Professors Gluck and Bressman found that 93% of respondents wanted to use
the "whole act" canon-that terms should be used consistently within an act or
related statutes. 320 The survey by Professor Walker of regulatory drafters at various
executive branch agencies found that 89% used the whole act rule in concept when
drafting, although only 25% used in pari materia.32 1 Indeed, Professor Walker
found that the concept that "statutory terms are presumed to have a consistent
meaning through a statute - always or often applies." 322 To the extent that the whole
act canon was not used by legislative or regulatory drafters, however, it was due
to "the significant organizational barriers that the committee system, bundled
legislative deals, and lengthy multidrafter statutes post to the realistic operation of
those rules."323

316 See generally Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation:A Much

Needed PurposiveApproach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 697.
317 Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory InterpretationFrom the Inside An Empirical
Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65 STAN. L. REv. 901, 905,
930 (2013); Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation,67 STAN. L. REv. 999,

1023 (2015).
318 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 317, at 930; Walker, supranote 317, at 1023. Gluck and Bressman

surveyed 137 Congressional counsel about approaches to legislative drafting while Walker did a
similar survey of individuals involved in drafting agency regulations.

319 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 317, at 937.
32 0
Gluck and Bressman found that 93% of their respondents found that statutory consistency of terms
was a goal, but emphasized that organizational barriers prevented them from reaching that goal. Id.

at 936.
321 Walker, supra note 317, at 1020. In Prof Walker's study of 123 individuals involved in drafting
regulations, 89% of drafters responded that they employed the whole act concept when drafting,
while only 25% utilized in pari materia and only 1% employed the whole code rule-in the specific
context of the survey, however, the code at issue was the entirely of the federal code, not just the
Internal Revenue Code.
322
Id at 1026.
323 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 317, at 905; see also Walker, supra note 317, at 1029-30. Walker's
survey found that drafters were "more confident in the presumption of consistent usage in the same
statute or section of a statute than they are across statutes, much less the entire [U.S.] Code." This
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According to Gluck and Bressman, use of the whole act canon cannot be
justified on the basis that it reflects Congressional will.324 That being said, the
canons of construction can be viewed as "external to the legislative process,"
which means that they can be used to coordinate "systemic behavior" or "impose
coherence" on the Code.32 5 Gluck and Bressman refer to this notion as "rule of law
norms": "the idea that interpretive rules should coordinate systemic behavior or
impose coherence on the corpus juris."326
Gluck and Bressman studied the legislative process, while Walker studied
the regulatory drafting process. In the case of the PLRs, however, the question of
theoretical consistency applies in the context of enforcement and application. The
IRS can recognize that the federal courts will use these canons as a basis for
interpretation, and that legislative counsel would like to use these canons more but
are restrained by the realities of the legislative process. To the extent that the
legislative process makes consistency difficult to achieve, the IRS has both the
power (through regulation and administrative guidance) as well as the expertise to
provide this consistency of viewpoint. Professor Walker's study shows that
consistency becomes more of a reality, a least on a "whole act basis" at the
regulatory level; the next step would be to reinforce that consistency at the
enforcement/application level. Reinforcing the use of these canons in interpreting
statutory language can reinforce Professor Williston's desire to "harmonize into a
more consistent whole a body of doctrines, many of which have grown up, if not
at haphazard, at least without particular references to one another."327
B. Consistency Between State Property Law and Federal Tax Law
The IRS has long struggled with the issue of the interplay of state property
law and federal tax law. Paul Caron coined the term "tax myopia" for the mistaken
view that the tax law stands on its own as a "self-contained body of law." 328 While

uncertainty among drafters was caused in part by a lack of confidence that consistency in language
was even considered at the legislative level. Id. at 1029-30.
324 Gluck & Bressman, supranote 317, at 954-55 ("Under most versions of the faithful-agent theory,
these canons should be rejected" but "if the courts applied these textual rules more consistently, their
application in the drafting process might persuade drafters to at least attempt to surmount some of
the institutional hurdles.").
325 Id.

at 905.

326 Id. at 961 ("the body of the law should make sense, and ...

it is the responsibility of the courts,
within the permissible meanings of the text, to make it so.") (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 252 (2012)); see also Abbe R. Gluck

& Lisa Schulz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside - An Empirical study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725, 788 (2014).
327 Williston, supra note 254, at 7; see also Gluck & Bressman, supra note 317, at 913 ("[J]udges are
legislative partners who should interpret statuses 'in a manner that . . . will produce a workable set
of laws.") (citing Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 845, 867 (1992)).
32 Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 14
VA. TAx REv. 517, 518 (1994).
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is axiomatic that federal tax law does not create or change state property rights;3 29
it is equally understood that state court interpretations of property do not dictate a
transaction's federal tax consequences.33 0 In Estate of Bosch, the Supreme Court
held that lower court decisions regarding the property rights of taxpayers were not
binding on the IRS for tax purposes, but should be given "proper regard." Of
course, this raises the question of what constitutes proper regard.3 3' The inherent
tension between state property law and federal tax law creates significant
ambiguity regarding the implications of the characterization of transaction for state
law purposes.332
In this case, the interplay between state law and federal law appears at a
much different point in the enforcement process. None of the PLRs address the
question of whether a contribution to capital to a partnership in return for a
partnership interest is a "transaction" or an "exchange." What would have been the
impact if the private foundation had obtained a state court ruling that its investment
in the partnership was (or was not) a transaction? In a state using an entity-based
theory of partnerships, the state court would have found that a transaction occurred.
Under Estate ofBosch, the IRS would need to give such a finding due regard, even
if it was not bound by such a finding-presumably, the IRS would give such a
finding "proper regard."3 33 Presumably, the IRS would disregard such a finding
only if it found that the proceeding was non-adversarial33 4 or that it was not a
correct statement of the law as would have been decided by the state's highest
court.335 Posing this hypothetical question is not to say that state law should have
the final say or that consistency is always necessary-rather, giving some
consideration to application of state law abides by the spirit of Estate of Bosch's
"proper regard" standard. To the extent that the treatment of a transaction under
the tax law can be harmonized with state property law without sacrificing the
purposes of the tax law it minimizes the need to resolve the thorny question of how
courts should deal with the conflict. 6

329 In the partnership context, for example, if the IRS determines that a tax allocation among partners

does not have substantial economic effect, it can re-order the allocation to prevent abuse under
Subchapter K. See I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (West 2015). Such a re-alignment, however, does not change
the underlying economic agreement (and associated state law contract and property rights) among
the parties.
33 See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (state court decisions arising out of a
bonafide adversary proceeding must be given "proper regard" but are not binding in determining the
federal tax consequences of a transaction).
331
332
3
334

31s
336

Id.
See Caron, supra note 328, at 587.
Estate ofBosch, 387 U.S. at 464.

d
See Caron, supra note 328, at 587.
Id
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C. Toward Achieving Consistency
Courts and regulators should attempt to interpret codified statutory
provisions in a manner that is both internally consistent and shows "proper regard"
of applicable state law provisions. This would further the goals of codification, the
underlying canons of statutory interpretations, and the dictates of Estate of Bosch.
In this case, the IRS should treat transactions in which a private foundation
exchanges capital in return for its partnership interest as a transaction in
accordance with and bringing consistency to the provisions of Code Sections 4941
and 721. Such an interpretation pays proper regard to the approach of most state
laws that a partnership is an entity, at least in this context. This consistency can be
achieved in a manner that serves the underlying purpose of Code Section 4941preventing acts of self-dealing between a private foundation and its disqualified
persons even if it disallows transactions that might be beneficial to the
foundation. 337

That being said, the IRS unquestionably has the authority to recharacterize transactions if the form of the transaction does not follow its economic
substance, or otherwise may be necessary to prevent avoidance of the tax laws."'
For the IRS, this authority derives mostly from the common law, although the IRS
has specific statutory and regulatory authority to re-characterize transactions as
necessary to serve the purposes of the tax code. This specific authority is especially
evident in Subchapter K.3 3 9 For example, Treasury Regulation Section 1.701-2 sets
forth a direct statement of regulatory authority to re-characterize transactions to
further the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. 340 The regulation starts with a
statement of the purpose of Subchapter K: "Subchapter K is intended to permit
taxpayers to conduct joint business (including investment) activities through a
flexible economic arrangement without incurring an entity level tax." 3 4 1
One of the assumptions "implicit in the intent of subchapter K" is that "the
form of each partnership transaction must be respected under substance over form
principles."3 42 This anti-abuse rule goes on to state if a partnership transaction is
for the principal purpose of reducing the partners' aggregate federal tax liability in
a manner that is inconsistent with the stated intent of Subchapter K, then the
"Commissioner can recast [a] transaction for federal tax purposes, as appropriate

.. See supra Part III.C.

See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 731 (1929); see also
Commissioner v. Nat'l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974) (stating that
338

the taxpayer may not use the substance over form doctrine to re-characterize a transaction, as the
taxpayer had choose the original form of the transaction).
"' In addition to general partnership anti-abuse rule of Treasury Regulation 1.701-2, the substantial

economic effect rules of Code Section 704 and Treasury Regulation 1.737-4 have anti-abuse rules
specifically applicable to the pre-contribution gain rules. I.R.C. § 704 (West 2015); Treas. Reg. §
1.737-4.
34 0
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended in 1995).
341 Id. § 1.701-2(a).
342
Id. § 1.701-2(a)(2).
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to achieve tax results that are consistent with the intent of subchapter K," including
disregarding the partnership in whole or in part, and treating the partnership's
assets and activities as to be owned and conducted, respectively by one or more of
its purported partners.343
Although Subchapter K appears to give the IRS plenary authority to recharacterize transactions for partnership income tax purposes, that authority is not
unlimited. The anti-abuse regulations state that "[t]he Commissioner can treat a
partnership as an aggregate of its partners in whole or in part as appropriate to carry
out the purpose of any provision of the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations
promulgated thereunder." 3 44 However, this authority is specifically limited if the
Code prescribes the treatment of a partnership as an entity, and that treatment and
the ultimate tax results, taking into account all of the relevant facts and
circumstances, are clearly contemplated by that provision. 34 5
Re-characterization of the form of a transaction by the IRS is done in the
name of preventing abuse of the tax laws. The anti-abuse rules are invoked by the
IRS in order to re-order a transaction in a situation where slavish devotion to the
form of the transaction would work to the detriment of the Code. That is not the
case here-in fact, it is quite the opposite. The re-characterization of the family
investment fund transaction as a co-investment is actually an attempt by the IRS
to liberalize the application of Code Section 4941 -in effect, creating a safe harbor
where one does not otherwise exist. The PLRs ignore the state law form of the
transaction (by disregarding it as a transaction at all) not in the name of preventing
abuse of the tax code, but to allow it. Moreover, the IRS has chosen (to date) to do
so in the context of a series of private letter rulings, rather than more binding (and
more scrutinized) guidance in the form of regulations or a revenue ruling or
revenue procedure.
In all of these PLRs, the private foundation is not merely investing in a
commercial hedge fund run by a third party of which disqualified persons happen
to be the other parties. As discussed earlier, the regulatory exceptions to indirect
self-dealing state that merely participating in an investment entity with other
disqualified persons is not an act of self-dealing if the entity is not controlled by
the private foundation and is not a 35% Controlled Entity.3 46 The self-dealing
concern arises, therefore, only in a situation where the private foundation controls
a significant stake in the partnership such that it has control of the investment entity
or other disqualified persons combined own over 35% of the interests in the
entity-voting interest in the case of a corporation, and profits interests in the case
of a partnership. 347 Thus, disqualified persons have retained investment control

Id. § 1.701-2(b)(1).
Id. § 1.701-2(e)(1) (emphasis added).
345 Id. § 1.701-2(e)(2)(i)-(ii). By way of example, the Regulations cite to the entity treatment of a
partnership under the controlled foreign corporation rules of Code Section 904. Id § 1.701-2(f) ex.
3.
346 See supra Part IlI.C.
347 I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(E)-(F) (West 2015).
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over the private foundation's assets, indirectly-the exact situation not allowed by
the regulatory exception for non-controlled entities. Direct control over the
investments of the private foundation by disqualified persons as the foundation's
trustees or directors subjects those individuals to an unqualified duty of loyalty to
the foundation when making investment decisions.3 48 Indirect control through a
controlled entity such as a family investment partnership now subjects those same
investment decisions to a second set of fiduciary duties and interests-those of the
disqualified persons who are co-partners. It is exactly this type of conflict of
interest that Congress intended to address, even if it meant that certain beneficial
transactions could not occur. 34 9
D. Living with the Dissonance: A Possible Safe Harbor
Given the history of Code Section 4941, it seems strange that Treasury
would go through the mental gymnastics of inventing the concept of co-investment
to justify these types of transactions. Conceptually, the weight of authority both as
a matter of legislative history, state law, and Subchapter K compels a contrary
conclusion at least with regard to the capital contribution exchange for a
partnership interest-there is, in fact, an exchange that should be a transaction for
tax purposes. Thus the concept of co-investment in the PLRs creates significant
dissonance with the treatment of partnership investments in almost every other
context.
Is the cost of this dissonance worth the price? Is the need to allow private
foundation investment in these types of family vehicles sufficiently important to
justify a tortured interpretation of Chapter 42 in a manner that is inconsistent with
other areas of law? The only compelling interest in allowing such transactions
appears to be that they are in the best interest of the private foundations engaging
in the transactions, which is decidedly not what Congress intended to be a factor
in the determination. Rather, the IRS should recognize that control over the private
foundation investments in this matter allows exactly the type of self-dealing that
Code Section 4941 was designed to prevent.
That being said, should the IRS determine that it is advisable to allow such
transactions to further the orderly investment of private foundation assets, it should
provide a limited regulatory safe harbor allowing such transactions, rather than
leaving an ad hoc road map to be reconstructed from the pieces of various PLRs.
In crafting such a safe harbor, the IRS should ask whether there is a way for the
For the duties of a directors of a nonprofit corporation, see MODELNONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 8.30,
8.31 (AM. BAR Ass'N, 3d ed. 2008); for the duties of a trustee of a charitable trust, see UNIF. TRUST
CODE art. 8 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
34 See supra Part I1I.C. (discussing the 1965 Report, which notes that that "when a person is asked
to represent two conflicting interests in the same transaction it is likely that he will, consciously or
unconsciously, favor one side over the other" and indicating that "it is better to forbid self-dealing
and to strike down all such transactions rather than to attempt to separate those transactions which
are harmful from those which are not by permitting a fiduciary (as is the donor when he is dealing
with charitable funds) to justify his representation of two interests.").
348
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state property law of partnerships, the provisions of Subchapter K, and Code
Section 4941 to co-exist peacefully. The answer may be found in Code Section
761's definition of a partnership.
Code Section 761 allows the IRS to power to exclude from the definition
of a partnership, and therefore, from the income tax regime of Subchapter K,
certain unincorporated associations formed for investment purposes.3 50 Assuming
all of the members of the organization agree, the IRS can exclude an
unincorporated association from the provisions of subchapter K as an investment
partnership under Code Section 761 (a)(1) if the participants: (1) own the property
as co-owners; (2) reserve the right to dispose of share of any property acquired or
retains; and (3) do not actively conduct business or irrevocable authorize some
person or persons acting in a representative capacity to purchase, sell, or exchange
such investment property, although each separate participant may delegate
authority to purchase, sell, or exchange his share of any such investment property
for the time being for his account, but not for a period of more than a year.5
If an investment partnership elects out of the Subchapter K regime,.it is
then treated as co-owned property. This co-ownership concept parallels the coinvestment concept that appears in the PLRs. As the tax code already has a
mechanism by which an investment partnership can be treated as co-ownership of
property, why not use it? Code Section 761 explicitly references co-ownership and
requires the foundation to have a right to dispose of its share of the property.
Moreover, it limits the ability of third parties to control investments in the long
term. Therefore, to the extent the concern arising out of family investment
partnerships is the conflict of interest in investment decisions, this conflict-is at
least limited in time to a period of a year and gives the foundation the ability to
remove itself from the investment partnership if it is not furthering its own
investment authority. Finally, such a provision harkens back to the days of the
UPA 1914 and the aggregate theory of partnership, one could view this
arrangement as establishing a version of a tenancy-by-partnership. Under modern
partnership laws, co-tenancies are explicitly excepted from the definition of a
partnership, thereby eliminating the consistency by making state partnership law
inapplicable.
The IRS previously has approved the direct co-ownership of investment
property under the self-dealing rules.352 The use of property during co-ownership
is not unlimited, however. While clearly a sale or exchange of property is an act of
self-dealing,3 53 the use of private foundation assets by or for the benefit a
disqualified person is also an act of self-dealing.354 Thus, even if the co-ownership
of an asset may be acceptable under Code Section 4941,355 the subsequent use of

See supra note 294 (discussion of Code Section 761(a)(1) and (2)).
351 Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1995).
352 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-51-037 (Sept. 20, 1996).
...I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,770 (Dec. 15, 1988) (addressing PLR 8842045).
354 I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1)(E).
3ss I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,770 specifically states, "We wish to note that we do not conclude
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the asset in a manner that is not consistent with proportionate co-ownership may
be an act of self-dealing separate and apart from the ownership. For example,
Treasury considered a tenant-in-common fractional interest ownership of an art
collection356 by a private foundation and a disqualified person. Because the art was
owned as tenants-in-common, both the private foundation and the disqualified
person by law had a right to possession for at least part of the time. This legal right
to possession notwithstanding, the IRS found hanging the art in the personal
residence of the disqualified person, even if for a proportionate amount of time,
would be a direct use of a foundation asset and therefore an act of self-dealing.3 57
Under this authority, the IRS would not abdicate its ability to oversee foundation
assets; rather, self-dealing transactions within the administration of the co-tenancy
would be subject to sanction.
This regime could be applied not only to the treatment of an investment
partnership for Subchapter K purposes, but also for purposes of the application of
Code Section 4941. Clearly, if the investment partnership could elect out of
Subchapter K, then it would be ignored for subchapter K purposes and, instead,
would be treated as if it were co-owned by the partners (here, presumably, the
private foundation and its disqualified persons) directly. The concern arises,
however as to whether the property is truly owned by the parties as "co-owners,"
as the property is, for state law purposes, treated as owned by the partnership. The
IRS has taken the position that a limited partnership by definition cannot elect out
of Subchapter K because it is not co-owned (a position completely contrary to the
PLRs). Accordingly, the Code Section 761 election may not necessarily need to be
made for purposes of Code Section 4941; rather, Code Section 761's standard
might be deemed fulfilled by a general partnership if the foundation retains an
interest in the underlying partnership property along the lines of a tenancy-inpartnership.
VI. CONCLUSION
The series of PLRs issued by the IRS endorsing the participation of private
foundations in investment entities controlled by a foundation's disqualified
persons could have been motivated by a desire to allow foundations to invest in
manner that lowers fees and expands investment opportunities. In that regard, the

that the ownership of property as tenants in common by private foundations and disqualified persons
is per se self-dealing." I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,770 n.l (Dec. 15, 1988); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul.
96-51-037 (Sept. 20, 1996).
356 Fractional ownership of art with a charity is a common technique used to avoid the limitation on
the charitable contribution income tax deductions for partial interests in property. See 1.R.C. §
170(f)(3)(B)(ii). See generally, Ramsay H. Slugg, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL PLANNING FOR ART
COLLECTORS AND THEIR ADVISORS, ch. 11 (2015).

I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,770 n.l (Dec. 15, 1988) (citing Rev. Rul. 74-600, 1974-2 C.B. 385)
(incidental or tenuous standard does not apply to the direct use of foundation assets by a disqualified
person, as opposed to a benefit to a disqualified person flowing from the private foundation's use of
35

its own assets).
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IRS efforts may have been well intentioned, but the only way to achieve the desired
result-by ignoring the existence of a transaction between the partnership and the
foundation and re-characterizing the transaction as co-investment-is significantly
flawed. The IRS exercised its anti-abuse discretion to allow a transaction that
fundamentally violated the underlying tenants of Code Section 4941 and in so
doing, caused significant theoretical inconsistency between various sections of the
Internal Revenue Code as well as a disconnect between state and federal law.
While consistency within the Code and among codes is not a necessary outcome if
it otherwise does not accomplish the underlying goals of the legislation, to the
extent that theoretical consistency can be achieved, it provides a beneficial level
of guidance and uniformity that might otherwise be unachievable through other
processes. Accordingly, the IRS should discard the co-investment concept of the
PLRs and apply Code Section 4941 as if a transaction between the foundation and
the investment partnership has occurred. To the extent that the IRS finds a need
for a limited safe harbor, it should craft regulations that use existing law to create
a theoretically consistent approach to co-ownership of investment assets that works
with Subchapter K, Code Section 4941, and applicable state law.

